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Abstract
The payment incentives of portfolio managers and investors are often asymmetrical such
that actions that benefit the portfolio manager can harm the client and vice-versa. Despite the
presence and potential harm of these asymmetries, relatively little research has investigated self
and other decision making broadly. There has also been few attempts to address the effect of
reward asymmetries. Additionally, despite the presence of reward asymmetries not every portfolio
manager will make risky decisions for their clients, which suggests the presence of an individual
difference characteristic. This study addresses these knowledge gaps by examining the effect of
interpersonally manipulative personality traits (the Dark Triad) on decision making for the self,
others, and under reward asymmetries. The potential positive effect of bonding on participants
was also examining. Narcissism and psychopathy were both associated with making riskier
decisions for others under reward asymmetries. However, there was an interaction between these
personalities, bonding and numeracy such that those high in narcissism and subjective numeracy
who bonded with their client made less risky decisions under reward asymmetries. Those high in
psychopathy and lower in objective numeracy who bonded with their client made riskier decisions
for their client in the other-reward only scenario. The implication of these results for decision
making for self and others is discussed.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
There are many situations in which some individuals give most - if not all - of their
decision making control to another person (e.g., investment portfolio managers, power-ofattorney, and doctors). Generally, this transfer of control is done with the expectation that the
other person will act in accordance with one’s best interest. For example, one might decide to
transfer control of investment decisions to an investment portfolio manager because one believes
the manager will behave in ways that will ensure a positive outcome. However, in this case there
are incentive asymmetries in place that threaten this assumption; often investment portfolio
managers are paid for every action taken on an investment account, meaning they are largely
unaffected by gains or losses (Brown, 1996). This payment structure can lead to “churning” or
excessive trading in order to generate commissions (Brown, 1996). Churning is problematic for
the individual as this excessive trading can be detrimental to the investor (Barber & Odean,
2000).
Nevertheless, not every investment portfolio manager will make decisions contrary to
their clients’ best interest, nor will they necessarily make selfish decisions for all of their clients
(Allen & Gorton, 1993). Yet, there is a dearth of research examining the ways in which
individuals balance self-benefit with other cost. Most glaring, there is a lack of studies
examining the effect of individual differences on the manner in which individuals balance selfbenefit with other cost. Three personality traits – together referred to as the Dark Triad – are
associated with greater concern for self, as opposed to other, interest (e.g., Jones & Figuredo,
2013). Therefore, these traits are most likely to be associated with greater prioritization of selfinterest over other-interest and may explain differences in selfish versus selfless decisions made
by portfolio managers. This study aims to address the lack of research examining decision1

making involving the consideration of self-interest and other-interest and the interplay of
malevolent personalities. Specifically, the present study examines the ways in which individuals
balance self-benefit with other-cost, as well as the effect of dark personalities on this process,
and a potential avenue to deter selfish decision-making.
1.1 DECISION-MAKING FOR THE SELF AND OTHERS
A considerable amount of research has focused on how individuals make decisions for
themselves. In contrast, there has been comparatively less research conducted examining the
decision-making processes underlying decisions made on behalf of others. Additionally, there is
a distinct lack of studies examining the differential weighting of self and other consequences
under reward asymmetries (i.e., oneself benefits from something that would harm another). The
existing literature, however, suggests that individuals make different decisions for others than
they would make for themselves (i.e., self-other asymmetry). For example, individuals exhibit
less loss aversion (i.e., the preference to avoid losses rather than acquire gains; see Tversky &
Kahneman, 1991 for a review) when making decisions for others than when making decisions
for themselves (e.g., Andersson, Holm, Tyron & Wengström, 2013; Polman, 2012). Further,
people consider risky economic decisions as being less risky when the consequences involve
others than when they involve the self (Mengarelli, Moretti, Faralla, Vindras & Sirigu, 2014).
Individuals are also less likely to engage in measures to prevent a potential negative consequence
when the consequence will be suffered by others than when it will be suffered by the self (Pollai
& Kirchler, 2012). Three perspectives have emerged to explain self-other asymmetry: (1) social
values, (2) cognitive, and (3) risk-as-feelings.
The central argument of the social values explanation of self and other decision making
asymmetry is that people make decisions for others based on the social value associated with
2

risk-taking in the given situation (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). More specifically, individuals place
greater weight on the societal value associated with risk-taking when making decisions for others
than when making decisions for the self (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). From this perspective, selfother asymmetries in decision-making will exist only in situations in which risk is socially
valued (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). Note, however, that the social value of risk-taking need not be
objective, merely perceived by the decision maker as valued (Stone & Allgaier, 2008). This
view is supported by findings such that individuals exhibit less risk aversion when making
decisions for others in domains in which risk-taking is valued (e.g., relationships) compared to
domains in which risk-aversion is not valued (e.g., health and physical safety) (e.g.,
Beisswanger, Stone, Hupp & Allgaier, 2003; Garcia-Retamero & Galesic, 2012; Stone, Choi, de
Bruin & Mandel, 2013).
Much of the support for this theory, however, comes from studies examining the
deviation of decisions made for the self and others to “ideal” decisions or decisions made for the
“ideal” self (e.g., Stone & Allgaier, 2008). Therefore, these studies rely on the assumption that
the “ideal” decision reflects the socially valued decision; yet, it is possible that these decisions
reflect choices made under “ideal” circumstances wherein the “ideal” outcome is certain.
Furthermore, these studies have also largely relied upon responses to hypothetical scenarios; yet,
studies have shown that responses to hypothetical scenarios differ from responses to real
decisions (Hsee & Weber, 1997). As such, although it is possible that decision making for others
reflects a regression to a risk-neutral point, more research is needed to determine if the riskneutral point reflects a socially defined level of acceptable risk.
Another explanation of self-other discrepancies in risk-taking is that individuals engage
in fundamentally different cognitive processes when making decisions for themselves versus

3

others. Researchers have variously argued that individuals differ in the information used to
make decisions for others, the effort used to make decisions for others, and the motivation to
make decisions likely to result in positive outcomes for others. For the purpose of clarity, we
will refer to this constellation of arguments as the cognitive hypothesis. There is evidence to
support some of these assertions such as the suggestion that individuals engage in different
informational processes when making decisions for others. Studies have shown that individuals
use more information when making decisions for themselves compared to others (Kray, 2000;
Kray & Gonzalez, 1999). For example, individuals asked to rate the importance of job attributes
in terms of deciding for two jobs rated more aspects as important when making the decision for
someone else than when making the decision for themselves (Kray, 2000). Additionally,
individuals have been shown to differentially weight aspects of a decision when making
decisions for the self or others (e.g., rate feasibility of options as more important when deciding
for others and desirability as more important when deciding for themselves) (Lu, Xie, Xu, 2012),
experience more pre-decisional distortion when making decisions for others (Polman, 2010), and
weight negative outcomes more heavily than positive ones when making decisions for the self
(Beisswanger et al., 2003). Together these findings suggest that individuals cognitive processing
and use of information differs when making decisions involving others versus themselves
Although individuals might vary in the cognitive processes used when making decisions
for themselves or others, this is not because individuals do not believe others are more risk
seeking than themselves. Studies have shown individuals perceive others would make decisions
about as risk-averse (Chakravarty, Harrison, Haruvy, & Rustrom, 2005) as they would for
themselves. Further, individuals exhibit self-other discrepancies in decision-making even when
they are able to accurately predict the level of risk-aversion of others (Garcia-Retamero &
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Galesic, 2012). Thus, the differences in utilization of information when making decisions for the
self and others is not due to a failure to conceptualize the preferences of others. Further, the
supposition that individuals differ in the effort and motivation used in making decisions for
others compared to decisions made for the self has not borne out in studies examining self and
other decision making (Hsee & Weber, 1997; Kray, 2000; Livitan, Trope & Liberman, 2008).
Together, these studies failed to explain the reason for differences in cognitive processing when
making decisions involving onself versus another person.
The risk-as-feelings hypothesis, however, posits a unique effect of emotion, which helps
explain differences in cognitive processes when making decisions for oneself versus someone
else. Specifically, this hypothesis supposes that individual’s behavior in risky situations is due in
part to their emotional response to features related to the risk (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee &
Welch, 2001). The core difference between this theory and other explanations of decisionmaking is that the risk-as-feelings hypothesis posits a unique and direct effect of emotion on
behavior (i.e., not necessarily mediated by cognitions) (Lowenstein et al., 2001). The risk-asfeelings hypothesis then suggests that self and other discrepancies are due in part to
discrepancies in emotional responses to negative outcomes (Loewenstein et al., 2001).
According to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, individuals are expected to react more
negatively to possible negative outcomes experienced by the self than negative outcomes
experienced by others (Loewenstein et al., 2001). This is supported by findings that individuals
to weight negative outcomes more negatively when making decisions for themselves than when
making decisions for others (Beisswanger et al., 2003). Additionally, neural pathways
responsive to rewards soon to be experienced by the self are not activated when the rewards will
be experienced by others, suggesting less affective engagement in decisions with outcomes
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relevant to others compared to those relevant to the self (Albrecht, Volz, Sutter, Laibson & von
Cramon, 2010). These studies support the risk-as-feelings hypothesis perspective that self-other
discrepancies are due in part to differences in affective responses to potential outcomes
experienced by others versus those experienced by the self.
There is also variation in the emotional engagement in decisions based on how close the
individual is to the target for whom they are making a decision. Put another way, individuals
generally discount outcomes experienced by others, but the degree of discounting varies
depending on how close the other is to the self. For example, individuals made more risk-averse
choices when they were primed to think of a friend as being close to them compared to when
they were primed to think of a friend as being distant from them (Trump, Finkelstein & Connell,
2014). Moreover, individuals assign more value to something belonging to a close friend than
when it belongs to a stranger (Greenstein & Xu, 2015). Individuals also exhibit similar cognitive
construals when making a decision for the self and when making the same decision for a close
other, but demonstrate different cognitive construals when making the decision for a more distant
other (Livitan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008). Neurological investigations have indicated that
similar brain regions are activated when a decision involves a close other being rewarded as
when a decision involves the self being rewarded (Mobbs et al., 2010). In contrast, different
neurological patterns were elicited when decisions affected the self-versus an unknown other
(Albrecht et al., 2010). A risk-as-feelings interpretation of these findings suggests that
individuals emotional reactions to decisions affecting close others are more similar to decisions
affecting the self, and this leads to less self-other asymmetry in decision making.
Several other psychological variables have been implicated as affecting self-other
decision-making asymmetry. For example, self-esteem and anxiety have been associated with
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variation in self-other decision-making (Wray & Stone, 2005). Additionally, empathy has been
shown to affect decisions made for others. For example, when asked to make predictions for
others, individuals with higher levels of empathy made predictions more similar to the ones they
made for themselves, than did less empathetic individuals (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006). Another
study found that higher levels of trait empathy were associated with less steep temporal
discounting when making decisions for others (O’Connell, Christakou, Haffey & Chakrabarti,
2013). These findings highlight the importance of considering individual differences when
examining decisions for oneself versus another person as personality traits might affect the
cognitive and emotional processes underlying decision making for the self and others.
Three commonly studied personality traits associated with interpersonal manipulation
and selfish decision-making are psychopathy, narcissism, and Machiavellianism (together
referred to as the Dark Triad) (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). These traits have been associated
with greater consideration of consequences and rewards relevant to the self rather than others
(e.g., Jones, 2014). Additionally, each of these traits is associated with a unique decision-making
style that might lead those higher in these traits to make more self-centered decisions. In this
way, those high in these traits are especially likely to pursue selfish interests to the detriment of
others making their consideration particularly relevant when examining differences in self and
other decision-making. Each personality trait is considered in turn below.
1.2 PSYCHOPATHY
Hervey Cleckley provided the first meaningful definition of psychopathy in his seminal
book The Mask of Sanity (1982). Cleckley (1982) conceptualized psychopathy as consisting of
sixteen criteria including: superficial charm, absence of anxiety, untruthfulness, lack of remorse,
failure to learn from experience, affective deficit, inadequately motivated antisocial behavior,
7

unresponsiveness in interpersonal relationships and incapacity for love. Research on
psychopathy is based largely on Cleckley’s work and his conceptualization of psychopathy is
widely accepted. In fact, some advocate to a return to the study of the traditional “Clecklian”
psychopath (Patrick, 2005).
Despite the importance of Cleckley’s definition the field was in need of a
psychometrically sound measure of psychopathy. Hare (1980) addressed this issue in his
publication of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). The PCL has the clinician rate individuals from
0 to 2 on 22-items, using a structured interview and file assessment; higher scores reflect greater
levels of psychopathy. Research examining psychopathy exploded following the release of the
PCL. Now in its second edition - the Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) - this assessment
remains the “gold-standard” in clinical psychopathy assessment (Hare, 1991; 2003). Clinical
psychopathy assessment is frequently used in research and practice involving correctional
populations. In correctional populations the PCL-R is considered a diagnostic tool, often used to
differentiate individuals who are psychopaths from those who are non-psychopaths.
Psychometric investigations into the structure of psychopathy, however, have indicated
that this personality does not reflect a discrete category, but rather a continuous trait (Levenson,
Kiehl & Fitzpatrick, 1995; Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996; Williams, Hare & Paulhus, 2007).
Investigations into psychopathy in everyday populations, or subclinical psychopathy, have
shown that an increased presence of the trait positively correlated with increased presence of
relevant outcomes (e.g., impulsivity and aggressive behavior) (LeBreton, Binning & Adorno,
2006). Thus, findings using the clinical criteria of psychopathy to examine group differences are
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likely to replicate were psychopathy to be examined as a continuous construct.1 Indeed, there is
relative consensus that psychopathy represents deficits in affective and emotional domains as
well as impulsivity and behavioral disinhibition (Hare & Neumann, 2005).
The etiological origins of psychopathy have received considerable attention and have
resulted in numerous theoretical frameworks. In his seminal article on the topic, Lykken (1957)
had participants complete a mental maze, which consisted of twenty choice points and four
response options at each point. One of the four response options would allow participants to
move forward, whereas one of the three error options (i.e., the choice of which would not allow
the participant to move forward) would elicit a shock. The explicit goal of the task was to
complete the maze with as few error choices as possible; participants were expected to learn the
association between the error response option and the aversive stimulus while completing the
task. Psychopaths failed to inhibit responses that would elicit the aversive stimulus (i.e., poor
passive avoidance). Further, psychopaths exhibited poor electrodermal conditioning to the
aversive stimulus.
Lykken (1957) proposed that these findings were indicative of poor fear conditioning in
psychopaths.2 Further, he argued that the core distinction between psychopaths and nonpsychopaths was a lack of fear - an idea referred to as the low-fear hypothesis (Lykken, 1957;
Lykken, 1995). The low-fear hypothesis has received support from findings that psychopaths
exhibit weaker electrodermal responsivity to aversive stimuli (e.g., Hare, 1978), poor passive
avoidance learning (e.g., Hetherington & Klinger, 1964), and reduced fear potentiated

1

There are some findings that question the generalizability of such findings to special populations, but these
arguments are not based on the dimensionality of the construct (for more information see Sullivan & Kosson, 2005
or Verona & Vitale, 2005).
2
Lykken was specifically concerned with the distinction between primary and secondary psychopathy. However, a
complete overview of the subfactors of psychopathy is outside of the scope and purpose of this paper. For more
information on debate regarding the subfactors of psychopathy see Williams, Paulhus & Hare, 2007.
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responding (e.g., Patrick, Bradley & Lang, 1993). Nevertheless, a number of studies have also
reported findings that conflict with those expected based on this model.
Schmauk (1970) attempted to replicate Lykken’s (1957) findings using three different
aversive stimuli: verbal, physical, and monetary. Psychopaths exhibited the expected poor
passive avoidance learning in all but the monetary condition. Later researchers argued that the
key difference between conditions in Schmauk’s (1970) study was that only the monetary
punishment condition did not include a concomitant reward (Newman, Patterson, Howland &
Nichols, 1990). In a study examining the importance of reward contingencies, participants
completed a go/no-go task with reward and punishment possible, or with only punishment
possible (Newman & Kosson, 1986). Psychopathic participants in the reward and punishment
conditions exhibited poor passive avoidance learning, but those in the punishment only condition
performed as well as their non-psychopathic counterparts (Newman & Kosson, 1986). This
study highlighted the importance of the presence of a reward contingency in the relationship
between poor passive avoidance learning and psychopathy. Additionally, studies have found that
psychopaths do not exhibit poor passive avoidance learning if the presence of punishment is
made explicit at the outset of the task (Newman, Patterson, Howland & Nichols, 1990) and
breaks are included in the task during which performance feedback is given (Newman, Patterson,
& Kosson, 1987). Together, these findings suggest the presence of a dysfunctional attentional
system in those with psychopathy.
Based on findings suggestive of the moderating role of attention in psychopathic behavior
- which was incongruent with the low-fear hypothesis - Newman and colleagues proposed the
response modulation hypothesis (RMH) of psychopathic decision-making (Newman et al.,
1990). The RMH proposes that deficits exhibited by those with psychopathy (e.g., poor passive
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avoidance learning, electrodermal hyporeactivity) are due to a failure in attention (Newman &
Baskin-Sommers, 2012). Specifically, in normal attentional processing individuals will
occasionally attend to peripheral stimuli such as the presence of a punishment contingency (i.e.,
response modulation) (Newman & Baskin-Sommers, 2012). However, when engaged in a goaldirected task, those high in psychopathy exhibit an “attentional bottleneck” in which they fail to
attend to information peripheral to their task (Newman & Baskin-Sommers, 2012).
The early selective attention of psychopaths has been shown to moderate the relationship
between psychopathy and poor passive avoidance learning (Newman et al., 1990), response
perseveration (Newman et al., 1987), and reduced fear potentiated startle (Newman, Curtin,
Bertsch & Baskin-Sommers, 2010). Furthermore, a meta-analysis of ninety-four studies, found a
significant relationship between psychopathy and response modulation deficits (r = .20) (Smith
& Lilienfeld, 2015). The theory has also received support from a more recent meta-analysis
specifically examining the relationship between psychopathy and fear deficits (Hoppenbrouwers,
Bulten & Brazil, 2016). A significant relationship between psychopathy and deficits in the
detection of threat stimuli was found, but not deficits in the response to fear stimuli
(Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016). This is consistent with findings that psychopaths exhibit the
expected fear potentiated startle response when they are forced to attend to the threatening
stimuli (Newman et al., 2010).
In respect to decision making, the RMH suggests that psychopaths engage in risky
behaviors due to their early selective attention, resulting in a later myopic focus on goal-relevant
information. Indeed, studies examining the behavioral correlates of psychopathy have found it to
be associated with numerous problematic behavioral outcomes including: gambling (e.g., Lösel
& Schmucker, 2004), substance abuse (e.g., Smith & Newman, 1990), risky sexual behavior
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(e.g., Fulton, Marcus & Payne, 2010), and aggressive behavior (e.g., Walsh, Swogger & Kosson,
2009). Further, those high in psychopathy are willing to accept risk when they will be subject to
the consequences, but also when others will suffer the consequences (Jones, 2013). In fact, in a
study examining interpersonal harm, psychopathy was the only dark personality associated with
willingness to harm a close other for personal profit (Jones, Carre, Tirres, Rangel & Sanchez,
2016). These findings are consistent with Cleckley’s (1982) assertion that psychopaths suffer
from a “pathological egocentricity and incapacity for love.” In addition, personality researchers
have found that psychopathy is associated with high agency (i.e., getting ahead) and low
communion (i.e., getting along) which suggests that those high in psychopathy care more about
their self-interest than the impact of their behavior on others (Salekin, Trobst & Krioukova,
2001). Thus, those high in psychopathy not only make riskier decisions for themselves because
they fail to attend to peripheral information, but they are also willing to engage in risk taking
when others will suffer the consequences.
1.3 NARCISSISM
According to Greek mythology, a man - Narcissus - loved himself so much that he fell in
love with his reflection in a pool of water. His own image was so attractive to himself that he
remained paralyzed by the pool staring at his own reflection until his death. Named after this
protagonist, the concept of narcissism has been studied by personality psychologists since the
early 19th century (Freud, 1914). Today, the most popular measure used in the study of
subclinical narcissism is the Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI) (Raskin & Hall, 1979).
The NPI was developed based on the criteria for the clinical disorder, Narcissistic Personality
Disorder (NPD), the criteria for which are outlined in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual
(American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Although related, those diagnosed with NPD are not
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considered to simply be at the extreme end of the narcissistic personality spectrum. Instead, it
has been argued that NPD represents a dysfunctional version of narcissism (Miller & Campbell,
2008). Those in favor of this view note the many benefits conferred to those higher in
narcissism; an example of which is that they are better able to handle negative feedback
(Rhodewalt & Eddings, 2002).
In general, those high in narcissism exhibit a grandiose self-image that conflicts with
reality. For example, those high in narcissism view themselves as more attractive (Gabriel,
Critelli, & Ee, 1994), more knowledgeable (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce & Lysy, 2003), and more
likeable (Grijalva & Zhang, 2016) than is reflective of reality. In a study examining
overclaiming of knowledge, those with higher levels of narcissism rated themselves as familiar
with fake terms at higher rates than those with lower levels of narcissism (Paulhus et al., 2003).
In fact, even when participants were made aware that there were false items in the list, those with
higher levels of narcissism still rated themselves as familiar with the fake terms. These findings
illustrate that narcissists consider themselves to be better than reality would suggest.
Ultimately, narcissists are motivated to maintain their overly positive self-view and to
have others evaluate them positively (Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001). Narcissists engage in selfregulatory strategies to maintain others’ positive views of themselves (Morf & Rhodewalt,
2001). A series of studies examining the relationship between narcissism and performance found
that narcissists performed better when there was an opportunity for self-enhancement compared
to situations in which there was not such an opportunity; performance of those with lower levels
of narcissism did not differ across situations (Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). In general, the selfregulatory strategies employed by narcissists tend to work, but only for a short period of time
(Paulhus, 1998). Upon first meeting, those high in narcissism are seen as better than those that
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are lower in narcissism (Paulhus, 1998). However, this effect reverses overtime such that those
with lower levels of narcissism are seen as better. In such instances when their self-regulatory
strategies fail, narcissists can become aggressive. In fact, narcissists react aggressively when
they are socially rejected (Twenge & Campbell, 2003) or insulted (Bushman & Baumeister,
1998; Jones & Paulhus, 2010). Thus, narcissists are concerned with establishing and maintaining
others’ positive views of themselves and will become aggressive when this positive view is
threatened.
Although intimately concerned with establishing a positive persona, narcissists are
mainly concerned with their performance in agentic - but not communal - domains. Agentic
concerns are inherently self-focused (e.g., power, dominance), whereas communality reflect
concerns regarding getting along with others in one’s group (e.g., agreeableness, warmth) (e.g.,
Bradlee & Emmons, 1992). Narcissists’ bias towards agentic concerns is evidenced by the fact
that narcissists are more likely to self-enhance in agentic domains, but not communal domains
(Grijalva & Zhang, 2016). In fact, this is a key difference between narcissism and the related
construct self-esteem. Specifically, in a series of studies narcissists rated themselves higher only
in agentic domains, whereas those high in self-esteem rated themselves highly in both agentic
and communal domains (Campbell, Rudich, & Sedikides, 2002). In the same study, narcissists
rated communal traits as less important than agentic traits. In general, narcissism is negatively
related to interdependent self-construal (i.e., view of the self as connected to others) and
positively related to independent self-construal (i.e., view of the self as distinct from others)
(Konrath, Bushman & Grove, 2009). In these ways, narcissists can be considered to be more
self-focused than other-focused.
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Narcissists’ agentic focus affects their perception and quality of their relationships with
others. Generally, narcissists do not view the quality of their relationships with others as
particularly important. This is evidenced by findings that those high in narcissism have less need
for intimacy (Carroll, 1987) and are more self-focused (Raskin & Shaw, 1988) than those lower
in the trait. In romantic relationships, narcissists tend to engage more in game playing due to
their need for power and autonomy (Campbell, Foster, & Finkel, 2002) and prefer partners that
are themselves self-oriented, admiring of the narcissist, and facilitate self-enhancement via
identification (i.e., by being with a “terrific” person the narcissist can also be seen as a “terrific”
person) (Campbell, 1999). In general, narcissists view their relationships with others as avenues
through which the narcissist can meet his/her needs (i.e., self-enhancement).
Despite their dispositional agentic bias, narcissists’ focus can be shifted to more
communal concerns. For example, those with higher levels of narcissism - as measured before
the beginning of the study - had reduced levels of narcissism after being primed with
interdependent self-construal (i.e., an emphasis on group membership) (Giacomin & Jordan,
2014). Narcissists also rated others as more deserving of help after an interdependent selfconstrual prime; this effect was mediated by a reduction in state narcissism resulting from the
prime (Giacomin & Jordan, 2014). Another study examined the utility of perspective taking
(i.e., considering a situation from another person’s point of view) in reducing narcissists’ selffocus. They found that although narcissists generally exhibit less empathy than non-narcissists,
when they are forced to take the perspective of a target, those high in narcissism exhibited more
empathic responses to a target individual (Hepper, Hart & Sedikides, 2014). Further, perspective
taking resulted in increased autonomic arousal in narcissists’ when presented with a narration of
an individual's emotional breakup (Hepper et al., 2014). These findings suggest that although
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narcissists are dispositionally more concerned with the self, their focus can be shifted to greater
concern for others.
Findings that narcissists’ myopic self and agentic focus can be altered are particularly
important given the negative outcomes associated with narcissism for both the narcissist and
those close to them. Specifically, narcissists exhibit relatively less concern for the outcomes of
others in decision making tasks, instead focusing on obtaining the best outcome for themselves
(Campbell, Bush, Brunell & Shelton, 2005). Although this tactic may result in a better overall
outcome for the narcissist, it can be devastating for those affected by his/her decisions; this is
especially true when the choices in the group/other’s best interests are contrary to the choices in
the narcissists’ best interest (Campbell et al., 2005). Nevertheless, the negative effect of
narcissistic decision-making is not limited to others close to the narcissist, as narcissists
themselves can also make decisions contrary to their own best interest.
Narcissism has been associated with greater risk taking; behaviorally, narcissists gamble
more frequently and spend more when they gamble (Lakey, Rose, Campbell & Goodie, 2008).
This risk-taking propensity has been replicated in laboratory settings in which narcissists have
been found to make riskier decisions on decision-making tasks (Brunell & Buelow, 2015).
Investigations into this propensity have uncovered two main reasons for this increased risk
taking: narcissists exhibit an approach motivation (Foster, Misra, & Reidy, 2009; Foster &
Trimm, 2008) and are overconfident in their ability to obtain the reward (Campbell, Goodie &
Foster, 2004; Lakey et al., 2008). Expressly, those high in narcissism evaluate the risk involved
in a decision similarly to non-narcissists, but narcissists’ exhibit greater sensitivity to the benefits
associated with the risk (i.e., those higher in narcissism exhibit greater approach motivation)
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(Foster, Shenesey, & Goff, 2009). This approach motivation then results in risky decisionmaking.
In addition to their focus on potential rewards associated with risky behavior, narcissists
are also more confident that they will succeed in obtaining these rewards. In a study examining
this tendency, participants completed computer based gambling tasks (Lakey, Campbell &
Goodie, 2008). Results indicated that narcissists expected to do better on the task and this
partially mediated the association between narcissism and risk taking (Lakey et al., 2008). This
narcissistic overconfidence is based on their inflated self-ego which leads narcissists to
overestimate their future and past ability regardless of objective feedback (Campbell, Goodie &
Foster, 2004). Taken together, these findings indicate that narcissists’ risky decision making is
the result of their myopic focus on reward and overconfidence in their ability that is not based in
reality. Further, because of their self-centered focus, they are unlikely to be concerned with the
potential of negative consequences suffered by others, unless they are forced to consider the
other’s perspective.
1.4 MACHIAVELLIANISM
Machiavellianism is a personality construct created by Christie and Geis (1970) to reflect
agreement with the philosophies espoused by political strategist Niccoló Machiavelli
(1513/1981). In his book The Prince, Machiavelli argues for a “whatever means necessary”
attitude for achieving success (Machiavelli, 1513/1981). In line with this, Christie and Geis
(1970) conceptualized Machiavellians as amoral, cynical in worldview, and a willing to
manipulate others to achieve their goals. Indeed, Machiavellianism has been associated with the
view that moral values are relative, not absolute (Leary, Knight & Barnes, 1986). As an
example, those high in Machiavellianism concern themselves with violations of intellectual
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property rights when they have low - but not high - levels of computer expertise (Stylianou,
Winter, Niu, Giacalone & Campbell, 2012). Essentially, when Machiavellians have the skill to
commit the violation, they are less concerned with others committing it as well (Stylianou et al.,
2012). In addition, after behaving unethically, those high in Machiavellianism report
experiencing less guilt than those lower in Machiavellianism (Murphy, 2012). In all,
Machiavellians are concerned with their success and are willing to skirt the bounds of traditional
ethicality to achieve their goals.
In pursuit of their self-interest, Machiavellians express a relative disregard for the
negative outcomes experienced by others resulting from their behavior. For example,
Machiavellians exhibit greater willingness to violate reciprocity norms (Gunnthorsdottir,
McCabe & Smith, 2002), violate the trust of a supervisor (Harrell & Hartnagel, 1976), and
withhold information pertinent to the sale of an item (Sakalaki, Richardson, & Thepaut, 2007) in
order to achieve the best outcome for themselves. Further, those high in Machiavellianism are
less willing to engage in helping behaviors when such action would not directly benefit
themselves. In businesses, Machiavellian employees are less likely to engage in organizational
citizenship behaviors (i.e., behaviors that benefit the company generally, not one person
specifically) unless others are around to view their behavior (Becker & O’Hair, 2007). They are
also less likely to share knowledge with their co-workers, an action that would not benefit them
directly, but is associated with benefits to the company as a whole (Liu, 2008). In an extreme
example, those high in Machiavellianism were found to be less likely to assist others during an
emergency (Wolfson, 1981). Generally, Machiavellians are unconcerned with the outcomes
suffered by others, unless such concern would be self-beneficial.
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In line with this self-interested focus, Machiavellians are less concerned with their
relationships with others. Those high in Machiavellianism report their relationships are less
important compared to those low in Machiavellianism (Lyons & Aitken, 2010). Instead,
Machiavellians are more motivated by extrinsic rewards (e.g., financial success) compared to
social concerns (e.g., the importance of family) (McHoskey, 1999). To achieve these extrinsic
rewards, Machiavellians will engage in interpersonally manipulative tactics; essentially
sacrificing communal values (i.e., getting along with others) in favor of agentic goals (i.e.,
getting ahead of others) (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a). Indeed, in their review of Machiavellianism,
Fehr, Samson and Paulhus (1992) noted that Machiavellians will use a variety of manipulative
tactics to achieve their goal including: lying, cheating, strategically self-disclosing information,
and ingratiating themselves to others. Taken together, these findings support the self-interested
manipulation assumed to be characteristic of Machiavellians (Christie & Geis, 1970).
Another characteristic feature of Machiavellianism is a cynical worldview (Christie &
Geis, 1970). Although they will engage in duplicitous tactics to meet their ends, those high in
Machiavellianism expect that others would behave in similar ways to themselves. In a study
examining trust in economic partnerships, those high in Machiavellianism reported less trust in
their partner and cited their partners’ perceived selfishness as the reason for this lack of trust
(Sakalaki et al., 2007). In another study, Machiavellians were found to be more likely to punish
someone who stole for them when the person exhibited remorse compared to when the thief did
not express remorse (Harrell, 1980). In fact, Machiavellians indicated distrust in the sincerity of
the remorse expressed by the person who stole from them (Harrell, 1980). In this way,
Machiavellians can be considered to think of distrust and selfishness as the norm, leading them
question the sincerity of trusting and selfless acts.
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Although the tactics employed by Machiavellians may be considered ethically
questionable, they are often successful. In financial decision paradigms involving another person
or people, those higher in Machiavellianism end up with more money at the end of the game
(e.g., Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014; Czibor, Vincze & Bereczkei, 2014; Spitzer, Fischbacher,
Hernberger, Gron & Fehr, 2007). Further, Machiavellian employees outperform nonMachiavellian employees when working in a more loosely structured workplace that allows for
flexibility (Gable, Hollon, Dangello, 1992; Shultz, 1993). Among salespeople,
Machiavellianism is associated with higher sales (Ricks & Fraedrich, 1999). Perhaps most
startling, a study examining profiles of United States Presidents found that higher scores of
Machiavellianism were associated with more charismatic leadership and better presidential
performance (Deluga, 2001). Nevertheless, Machiavellianism is not beneficial in all situations.
For example, although Machiavellian salespeople have been found to have higher sales, they also
had worse supervisor evaluations (Ricks & Fraedrich, 1999). In these ways, researchers construe
Machiavellianism as an adaptive trade-off. Specifically, the trait confers some competitive
advantages in certain situations, but not in every situation (e.g., Jones, 2016).
In an attempt to explain the success of Machiavellians’ manipulative tactics, some have
proposed an association between Machiavellianism and Theory of Mind (ToM) (McIlwain,
2003). The argument is that those who are better able to understand the intentions, beliefs, and
knowledge of others (i.e., those with greater ToM) would also be better able to manipulate others
(McIlwain, 2003). Investigations into this relationship, however, have found no significant
association between Machiavellianism and ToM (Paal & Bereczkei, 2007) or small negative
correlations with ToM (Ali & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2010; Lyons, Caldwell & Shultz, 2010). The
only area related to ToM in which Machiavellians have been found to perform better than non-
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Machiavellians is in the recognition of others’ negative emotions (Bagozzi et al., 2013). Similar
attempts to associate Machiavellianism with greater intelligence (O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks &
Story, 2013) have also failed to find a relationship. Thus, the success of Machiavellians cannot
be attributed to differences in mind-reading ability or intelligence, emotional or otherwise.
More recently, researchers have proposed that the effectiveness of Machiavellian
strategies is due to their ability to adapt their responses to the constraints of their social
environment (Bereczkei, Deak, Papp, Perlaki & Orsi, 2013). Support for this view comes from
findings that Machiavellians behave differently depending on punishment/reward contingencies.
For example, those high in Machiavellianism are less likely to make charitable or helping offers
when such offers are made anonymously; when offers are made publicly those high in
Machiavellianism do not differ from those low in the trait in terms of offers (Bereczkei, Birkas &
Kerekes, 2007; Bereczkei, Birkas & Kerekes, 2010). The addition of the publicity of the offers
of help changes the reward/cost contingency insofar as offers of help/charity might lead to
increased social reputation (Bereczkei et al., 2007; Bereczkei et al., 2010). In a study examining
financial decision making, participants were given an amount of money and had to decide how
much to keep and how much to give their partner (Spitzer et al., 2007). When the partner was
unable to punish them, those high in Machiavellianism offered significantly less to their partner
(Spitzer et al., 2007). However, when the possibility of punishment was introduced,
Machiavellians offered significantly more than they had when punishment was not possible
(Spitzer et al., 2007). Additional studies have found that Machiavellians moderate the amount
they contribute to others based on the behavior of their partners (Bereczkei & Czibor, 2014;
Czibor & Bereczkei, 2012). Findings such as these offer support for the view that
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Machiavellians are sensitive to their environment and will adapt their behavior in order to
achieve the best outcome based on environmental constraints.
The cognitive mechanism(s) that allows those high in Machiavellianism to adapt to their
environment is still subject of some debate. One possible explanation is that those high in
Machiavellianism are more motivated to explore the mental states of others (i.e., spontaneous
mentalization) (Bereczkei, 2015). Indeed, researchers have found that individuals’ level of
Machiavellianism is associated with the spontaneous generation of mental states of others
(Esperger & Bereczkei, 2011). However, despite this apparent tendency to explore others mental
states, Machiavellians are able to emotionally detach during the decision making process
(Bereczkei, 2015). A study examining this emotional detachment had participants decide how
much money to give to the group, versus keep for themselves (Czibor, Vincze & Bereczkei,
2014). After making their decision, individuals wrote about their decision making process
(Czibor et al., 2014). Machiavellians used more verbs related to cognitive - not emotional concerns (Czibor et al., 2014). Finally, it is possible Machiavellians’ adaptability is due to their
focus on potential social risks. This assertion is supported by findings that Machiavellians attend
to negative facial features of others (Bagozzi et al., 2013) and regions of the brain associated
with attending to social risk are more active in Machiavellians during decision making tasks
(Spitzer et al., 2007). Although preliminary research seems to support each of these mechanisms
as important in the adaptiveness of Machiavellianism, additional research is needed to determine
a causal link. Nevertheless, it is clear that Machiavellians possess skills that allow them to
effectively adapt to their environment. These studies suggest that Machiavellians are willing to
engage in risky behavior when they will not suffer the consequences of their actions.
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1.5 THE DARK TRIAD
The personality traits discussed above were studied in relative isolation until the
publication of an article by Paulhus and Williams (2002) that provided evidence that the traits
are overlapping, yet distinct constructs. Prior to their publication, there were few studies that
empirically compared the traits. The few existing studies that compared at least two of the three
traits, found moderate, positive correlations between them, indicating some degree of trait
overlap (Gustafson & Ritzer, 1995; McHoskey, 1995; McHoskey, Worzel, & Szyarto, 1998).
However, the degree of overlap and distinctiveness of the traits was subject of some debate;
some researchers - most notably McHoskey and colleagues - argued that at least some of the
traits were reflective of one underlying construct. Specifically, McHoskey and colleagues
argued that Machiavellianism is a subclinical form of psychopathy (McHoskey, Worzel &
Szyarto, 1998).
In an effort to establish whether the traits were distinct or representative of a single
underlying construct Paulhus and Williams (2002) examined the correlations between traits, as
well as the correlation of each with intelligence, other personalities and self-enhancement. They
found that the traits shared modest positive correlations with each other (r’s between .25 and .50)
suggesting some trait overlap. However, each showed a different pattern of association with the
Big Five traits. For example, Machiavellianism was associated with unconscientiousness and
disagreeableness whereas narcissism was associated with extraversion, openness, and
disagreeableness. The traits converged however, insofar as each was associated with
disagreeableness. Furthermore, only narcissism was positively correlated with overall IQ;
psychopathy and Machiavellianism were instead associated with greater nonverbal compared to
verbal IQ. Finally, narcissism - but not Machiavellianism or psychopathy - was correlated with
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self-enhancement. These results suggested that although the traits overlap, they are distinct
constructs.
Later studies have confirmed the moderate correlations between Machiavellianism,
psychopathy, and narcissism (e.g., Rauthmann, 2012; Vernon, Villani, Vickers & Harris, 2008).
Additionally, studies have established unique behavioral outcomes of each trait (e.g., Jones &
Olderbak, 2013). Despite the evidence that these traits represent different underlying constructs,
some continue to argue that the Dark Triad traits is best represented a unitary construct. Recent
unificationist perspectives have used evolutionary psychology and personality trait psychology
research to argue for these traits represent a unitary construct.
Historically, evolutionary psychologists have argued that malevolent traits can be
considered to reflect a single construct insofar as they all represent a similar, evolved adaptation
for short-term exploitation (Mealy, 1995; Wilson, Near, & Miller, 1996). In this vein, some have
argued for the unification of the Dark Triad insofar as they all reflect a socially exploitative style
(e.g., Jonason, Koenig & Tost, 2010). Supporting this view are findings that the traits are each
associated with a fast life-history strategy (i.e., more effort allocated to reproductive effort),
short-term mating in men and sex differences in levels of the Dark Triad3 (Jonason et al., 2010;
Jonason, Li, Webster & Schmitt, 2009). However, when the relationship between the Dark Triad
traits and life history strategies was explicitly tested, only psychopathy was correlated with a fast
life history strategy (Jonason et al., 2010). Further, subsequent investigations have found unique
associations between Dark Triad traits and sexual coercion (Jones & Olderbak, 2013) as well as
infidelity (Jones & Weiser, 2014). Thus, although all three traits might use a socially

3

A number of studies have found that the men have higher scores than women on measures of the dark triad, but
both genders display similar patterns of association with external variables (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002).
Arguing from an evolutionary perspective that women have more “at stake” for reproductive activities that women
would show less of a fast life history strategy.
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exploitative style, the specific style and the consequences therein are different for each
personality trait. Therefore, one cannot assume that those high in these traits will behave
uniformly in every situation, thereby supporting the importance of examining all three of these
traits in future studies.
Unification arguments based on personality trait research have focused on the
relationship between the Dark Triad traits and big five traits, as well as the location of the Dark
Triad within the interpersonal circumplex. Studies that have examined the relationship between
the Dark Triad and big five traits have consistently found a negative correlation between each of
the three traits and agreeableness (e.g., O’Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, Story & White, 2014).
Additionally, those that have attempted to locate the Dark Triad within the interpersonal
circumplex4 have found that all three traits are characterized by low levels of communion or
getting along, as well as high levels of agency or getting ahead (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a). Based
on these findings researchers have variously argued that the Dark Triad simply represents the
inverse of agreeableness (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006) or the location in personality space of highagency and low-communion (Rauthmann & Kolar, 2012).
Though these assertions are based on well replicated findings, they fail to consider the
plethora of research indicating the traits practically diverge insofar as the behaviors each
uniquely predicts. For example, studies have found unique associations between the traits
insofar as predicting aggression (Jones & Paulhus, 2010; Pabian, De Backer & Vandebosch,
2015), financial risk acceptance (Jones, 2013; Jones, 2014), impulsivity (Jones & Paulhus,
2011b), infidelity (Jones & Weiser, 2014), prejudice (Jones, 2013), scholastic cheating
(Nathanson, Paulhus & Williams, 2006), and deviant sexual behavior (Williams, Cooper,

4

The Interpersonal circumplex defines personality on two axes, agency (getting ahead) and communion (getting
along) (Wiggins, 1979).
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Howell, Yuille & Paulhus, 2009), to name a few. Thus, although one may argue the overlap
between Dark Triad traits is disagreeableness or high-agency and low-communion, one cannot
discount the unique variance associated with each trait; to do so would be to assume the
prediction and understanding of the aforementioned behaviors is unimportant. Instead, the goal
of the study of the Dark Triad should be to explicate the nature of the overlap between the traits,
the outcomes associated with this overlap, as well as the manner in which the Dark Triad diverge
and the unique associations of each trait.
Several perspectives have emerged in the past decade regarding the nature of the overlap
between the Dark Triad traits. Adopting an evolutionary perspective, Jonason and his colleagues
have argued that the Dark Triad is reflective of a socially exploitative style exemplified by a fast
life history-strategy (Jonason et al., 2010). This perspective has proven difficult to assess,
however, due to its lack of specificity as well as contrary correlations. In contrast, others have
submitted that the overlap between the traits is the inverse of the agreeableness factor (i.e.,
disagreeableness) of the big five (Jakobwitz & Egan, 2006). This association between Dark
Triad traits and disagreeableness is well-replicated and robust; a recent meta-analysis examined
this relationship and found r’s between -.36 and -.53 for the relationship between each trait and
agreeableness (O’Boyle et al., 2014).
A new factor model has recently been proposed to represent differences in individual
personality traits better than the big five, based on lexical investigations in multiple languages
(Lee & Ashton, 2004). The new factor model includes the original big five traits as well as a
sixth factor termed honesty-humility; the new six factor model is referred to as the HEXACO
model (Lee & Ashton, 2004). Investigations into the association between the Dark Triad traits
and HEXACO dimensions have found that the traits are more strongly associated with a lack of
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honesty-humility than with disagreeableness (Lee & Ashton, 2005; Lee & Ashton, 2014).
Furthermore, the Dark Triad traits and a lack of honesty-humility predict similar outcomes such
as short-term mating, desire for power, and materialism; these outcomes were not predicted by a
lack of agreeableness (Lee et al., 2014). Most recently, Jones and Figuredo (2013) conducted a
series of factor analyses and found that the overlap between traits is best represented as
callousness and manipulation. Regarding the association with the HEXACO model, they argue
although the lack of honesty-humility reflects some of the overlap between traits it misses the
callousness that is common between these traits (Jones & Figuredo, 2013). Indeed, other studies
have supported that the Dark Triad traits are associated with a lack of empathy (Wai &
Tilipoulos, 2012). At this time the best evidence suggests that the “core” of the Dark Triad is
callous-manipulation.
Since the publication of Paulhus and Williams’ (2002) seminal article, a plethora of
studies have been published attempting to establish the nature of the divergence between the
traits. The available studies suggest Machiavellianism is a strategic form of callousmanipulation, whereas psychopathy and narcissism reflect reckless and grandiose callousmanipulation, respectively. The reckless nature of psychopathy is supported by findings that
psychopathy is uniquely associated with dysfunctional impulsivity (Jones & Paulhus, 2011b),
riskier forms of academic dishonesty (Williams, Nathanson & Paulhus, 2010), and risking
other’s money in the face of almost certain loss (Jones, 2013). In contrast, Machiavellians will
engage in strategic forms of deviant behavior as exemplified by findings that Machiavellianism
alone is not associated with any form of impulsivity (Jones & Paulhus 2011) and that
Machiavellians will engage in academic cheating when the risk of detection is minimal
(Williams et al., 2010). Finally, the grandiose nature of narcissists is evidenced by the finding
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that narcissists alone will aggress in response to ego-threat, but not physical threat (Jones &
Paulhus, 2010). As can be seen a number of studies have established that the Dark Triad traits
are each associated with unique outcomes. Thus, one cannot assume that a finding for one of
these personality traits will necessarily generalize to another. Therefore, studies that are
interested in the effect of interpersonally manipulative personalities should examine all three of
these traits to establish the overlap and divergence insofar as whet they predict.
1.6 SUMMARY AND PRESENT STUDY
Findings from studies examining decision making for the self and others suggest
differences in the cognitive processes involved in risky choices due to differences in individual’s
emotional reactions to consequences affecting the self and others (e.g., Kray, 2000; Loewenstein
et al., 2001). Specifically, less emotional reactivity to decisions involving consequences for
others has been proposed to explain findings that individuals are relatively more risk tolerant
when making decisions for others (e.g., Polman, 2012). However, the specific consequences of
self-other reward asymmetries have yet to been fully examined. Additionally, the effect of
dispositionally selfish personalities on differences in self and other decision-making is yet to be
established (see Table 1 for a summary of the differences between the Dark Triad traits for
decision making and relationships with others). This is particularly problematic as individuals
high in dark personality traits – which are characterized by low empathy, interpersonal
manipulation, and selfishness – are especially unlikely to be emotionally reactive to
consequences suffered by others (Jones & Figuredo, 2013). Thus, individuals are generally more
likely to engage in risky behavior when others will suffer the consequences and this tendency is
likely to be moderated by dispositional characteristics.
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Table 1: Summary of Differences in Dark Triad Characteristics

Decision Making
Style

Relationship
with others

Machiavellianism

Psychopathy

Narcissism

Flexible strategy, able
to consider long-term
consequences

Focus attention on
goal/reward to
exclusion of noticing
punishment cues

Overconfident in
abilities, greater
sensitivity to reward

Willing to harm close
others to obtain a
reward

Self-centered
orientation, view others
as useful only as much
as they reflect
positively on the self

Cynical worldview, use
others before they use
me

Another moderator of risk taking when the self or others will suffer the consequences is
interpersonal closeness. Expressly, one’s emotional reactions to risky decisions are likely to
vary as a function of how close the other is perceived to be to the self (Hsee & Weber, 1997).
Indeed, studies have shown that individuals engage in less risk taking behavior when close –
rather than distant – others will suffer the consequences (Trump, Finkelstein & Connell, 2014).
Nevertheless, those high in dark personality traits Machiavellianism and psychopathy are
unlikely to be affected by interpersonal closeness due to their cynical worldview and attentional
deficits respectively. However, as previous studies have found the effect of narcissism is
dampened when a communal orientation is primed, interpersonal closeness might mediate the
risk-tolerance of those high in narcissism when making decisions for others (Giacomin & Jordan,
2014).
In this study, the effect of self and other reward asymmetries, as well as interpersonally
manipulative personality traits, on self and other decision-making was examined. Interpersonal
closeness was also examined as a potential moderator affecting decision making for oneself
versus others. To this end, participants were tasked with making investment decisions for
themselves or another person under three reward contingencies (1) other reward only, (2) self29

reward and other reward asymmetry, and (3) self-reward only. The order of the first two
contingencies was randomized. Prior to the investment task, individuals either engaged in a
bonding or neutral activity with their “client” in order to manipulate the perceived closeness of
the individual with the “client.” Further, participants’ levels of Dark Triad personality traits
were assessed in order to determine the effect of these traits on decision making for others
compared to the self, as well as the potential effect of interpersonal closeness, on these decisions.
Seven hypotheses were examined for this study:
H1: Individuals will make riskier decisions for the other person when there are selfreward and other-reward asymmetries compared to when there are only other-rewards or selfrewards.
H2: Individuals who did not bond with the other person will make riskier decisions for
the other person in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions compared
to those who did bond with the other person.
H3: Individuals who complete the self- and other-reward asymmetry condition first will
anchor their subsequent decision in the other-reward only condition to their decision in the selfand other-reward asymmetry condition.
H4: Individuals higher in narcissism will make riskier decisions for others in the otherreward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions.
H5: Those higher in narcissism who have bonded with the other person will make less
risky decisions for the other person in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry
conditions than those higher in narcissism who did not bond with their partner.
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H6: Individuals higher in psychopathy will make riskier decisions for others in the otherreward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions regardless of whether they have bonded
with the other person.
H7: Individuals higher in Machiavellianism will make riskier decisions for others in the
other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions regardless of whether they have
bonded with the other person.
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Chapter 2: Method
2.1 POWER ANALYSIS
A power analysis was conducted using the statistical software G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder,
Buchner & Lang, 2009). Previous studies have found about a medium effect of empathy (Faro &
Rottenstreich, 2006) as well as interpersonal closeness (Livitan, Trope & Liberman, 2008) on
decision making for others. Additionally, a previous study utilizing the bonding manipulation
used in this study found a medium sized relationship between bonding and perceived closeness.
As such, I estimated a medium effect size (f 2 = 0.15). The analysis indicated that to conduct a
linear regression with seven independent variables, 103 participants would be needed to have an
80% chance of detecting a medium effect should one exist in the population.
I also calculated the number of participants needed to compare the differences between
conditions using a repeated measure ANOVA with two between-subjects variables (i.e., bonding
and order of conditions). This analysis indicated that 68 participants were needed to have an
80% chance of detecting a medium effect should one exist in the population.
2.2 PARTICIPANTS
A total of 160 participants were recruited from a medium sized university in the
southwest of the United State of America. Four participants were deleted from subsequent
analyses due to their prior relationship with their partner for the study; two participants were in a
romantic relationship and two participants knew each other since high school. Additionally, 28
participants were removed from subsequent analysis because they failed an attention-check.
Finally, one participant was excluded due to computer malfunction during data collection. This
resulted in a final sample size of 127 participants (63% female; 85% Hispanic; 𝑀𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 20.92;
𝑆𝐷𝑎𝑔𝑒 = 4.528).
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2.3 MATERIALS
2.3.1 Investment Game
This activity consisted of “game board” and two stacks of eleven, 3”x5” note cards
labeled hard or easy. On the back of the note card were business questions with varying degrees
of difficulty depending on whether they are a hard or easy question. The game board was a
black poster board with eleven blocks - approximately 3”x5” - numbered 2 through 12. Each
space had a 2”x2” green piece of paper adhered to the center with the shade of green indicating
the probability of a roll of two dice resulting in the number corresponding to the space (e.g., 2, 3,
and 4). The darker green squares were placed on the spaces corresponding to the more likely
dice rolls (e.g., 7) whereas the lighter green squares were placed on the spaces corresponding to
the less likely dice rolls (e.g., 2 or 12).
2.3.2 Bonding Activity
Participants were randomly assigned to answer a series of increasingly personal questions
or take turns reading A Winter’s Tale (Shakespeare, n.d.).
2.4 MEASURES
The means and standard deviations of all measures are reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Self-Report Measures
Measure

Mean

Standard Deviation

SRP-SF

2.016

0.573

NPI-13

0.292

0.212

Mach-IV

2.604

0.467

EQ

2.285

0.265

ONS

0.710

0.208

SNS

3.850

1.082
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2.4.1 Psychopathy
The short form of the Self-Report Psychopathy scale (SRP-SF) (𝛼 = 0.912) was used to
measure subclinical psychopathy (Paulhus, Neumann, & Hare, in press). The SRP-SF consists
of four inter-correlated lower-order factors (i.e., interpersonal manipulation, callous affect,
erratic lifestyle, and antisocial behavior) with a higher order factor of psychopathy. The
composite score of psychopathy was used in this study. The SRP-SF has participants rate their
agreement with items on a 5-point Likert-type scale (e.g., “I have been arrested”).
2.4.2 Narcissism
The thirteen item Narcissistic Personality Inventory (NPI-13) (𝛼 = 0.736) was used to
measure narcissism (see Appendix A; Gentile et al., 2013). This scale has participants choose
between a narcissistic statement and a non-narcissistic statement (e.g., “I like to look at my
body” or “My body is nothing special”).
2.4.3 Machiavellianism
The Mach-IV (𝛼 = 0.753) was used to measure Machiavellianism (see Appendix B;
Christie & Geis, 1970). This is a 20-item measure that has participants rate their agreement with
items on a 5-point Likert-type scale (e.g., “It is wise to flatter important people”).
2.4.4 Empathy
The 40-item Empathy Quotient (EQ) (𝛼 = 0.758) questionnaire was used to measure
participants’ empathy (see Appendix C; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004). This scale has
participants rate their agreement with a series of statements on a 1(Strongly Agree) to 4(Strongly
Disagree) Likert-type scale (e.g., “I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a
conversation”). This questionnaire also includes 20 non-target items to obfuscate the true
purpose of the questionnaire.
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2.4.5 Subjective Numeracy
The Subjective Numeracy Scale (SNS) (𝛼 = 0.843) was administered to measure
participants’ numeracy (see Appendix D; Fagerlin et al., 2007). Numeracy was measured in
order to control for its effect on risky choices; previous studies have suggested that numerical
skills are significantly related to performance on measures of risk (Dave, Eckel, Johnson &
Rojas, 2010). This scale consists of eight questions in total; four of the questions measuring selfreported ability to perform mathematical tasks (e.g., “How good are you at working with
fractions?”) and four measuring participants’ preference for the presentation of statistical
information (e.g., “How often do you find numerical information to be useful?”).
2.4.6 Objective Numeracy
An objective measure of numeracy was also administered in order to assess participants’
actual numeracy (𝛼 = 0.728) (see Appendix E; Lipkus, Samsa & Rimer, 2001). Although the
subjective numeracy scale correlates well with this measure administration of both measures
allowed us to account for participants’ overconfidence in their numeracy ability, as well as their
actual numeracy ability. This is especially relevant in the measure of narcissism, as those higher
in narcissism tend to overclaim their knowledge (Paulhus, Harms, Bruce & Lysy, 2003).
2.4.7 Interpersonal Closeness
All participants completed the Inclusion of Other in Self (IOS) scale in order to verify
that the bonding manipulation resulted in increased interpersonal closeness (see Appendix F;
Aron, Aron & Smollan, 1992). This measure includes seven Venn diagrams with varying
degrees of overlap; participants indicate their perceived closeness with another by indicating the
Venn diagram most representative of their relationship with the other person.
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2.5 PROCEDURES
Three participants were recruited for each lab session. Two of the participants were
assigned to participate in the study, whereas the other participant completed several online tasks
for a separate study. If one of the participants did not show up at the start of the experiment, the
other two participants were told they would start the study and one of the researchers would wait
for the third participant and start them through the study once s/he showed up.
The two participants assigned to complete the study were brought to an experimental
room at which point they were given one of two packets by the researcher. Inside the packet was
either a bonding activity or a neutral activity. Participants assigned to the bonding activity
answered a series of increasingly personal questions; this has been shown to increase the
inclusion of the “other” in one’s self-concept in previous studies (Benavidez, Neria & Jones,
2016. Participants also circled each question they completed during the bonding activity. Those
assigned to the neutral activity took take turns reading Shakespeare’s A Winter’s Tale
(Shakespeare, n.d.); previous studies have found that this activity does not increase self-other
concept overlap (Benavidez et al., 2016). Further, Arthur Aron (November, 2012) indicated a
neutral activity should be included that does not involve asking questions.
The activity packets were approximately the same weight and were the same size and
color. The researcher was blind to which packet contained each activity and randomly handed
the participants one of the packets. Once participants’ were given one of the packets by the
researcher, they instructed the participants to complete the activity in the packet, following the
directions outlined on the first page. The researcher then left the experimental room in order to
remain blind to the participants’ assigned condition. Upon leaving the room, the researcher set a
timer for 15 minutes on his/her phone. At the conclusion of the 15 minutes, the researcher
returned to the room and instructed participants that the activity was finished and the participants
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would be separated for the remainder of the study. The researcher emphasized that the two
participants would not be interacting with each other again during the study.
At this point in the study, one of the participants was taken to a separate experimental
room by a researcher. Once alone, both participants were told that they would be completing an
investment game and that they had been assigned the role of the broker and their partner they
completed the activity with had been assigned the role of the investor (i.e., they both were told
that they were the broker and the other participant was the investor).
Each participant was then presented with the materials for an “Investment Scenario”:
game board and two stacks of questions labeled easy or hard. Participants were asked a hard and
easy question in order for them to gauge the difficulty of each question. Additionally,
participants were told that the hard questions were unlikely to be answered by most anyone,
whereas even minimal knowledge of business would likely result in a correct response to an easy
question. They were then given a sheet with the instructions for the “Investment Scenario” (see
Appendix G) for them to read while the researcher explained the scenario.
The research explained that the participant was tasked with setting up the game board
with one question on each space on the board. Once a question was placed on each board space,
the participant was told they would roll two dice. It was explained that the question on the board
space corresponding with the dice roll would be asked to the third participant (i.e., not their
client who they completed the activity with) at the end of all the rounds of the scenario. The
outcome for the broker/investor would then depend on whether the third participant correctly
answered the selected question within 20 seconds of the question being asked. The third
participant was chosen to answer the questions in order to reduce the effect of overconfidence on
participants’ decisions. This was deemed necessary as those higher in narcissism have been
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shown to engage in greater risk taking due to their overconfidence (Lakey et al., 2008).
Additionally, each participant answered two questions assessing their confidence that the third
participant would answer a hard/easy question correctly – after the instructions of the scenario
were explained – so that the effect of confidence on participants’ decisions could be examined.
After assessing participants’ confidence, the research explained that not every board
space was equally likely to be selected from a roll of two dice. The researcher then provided
participants with a sheet listing the probability of a roll of two dice resulting in each number
corresponding with each board space. The meaning of the green squares on the board spaces
was also explained to the participant by the researcher. Specifically, the participant was told that
darker green squares corresponded to more likely dice rolls, whereas the lighter green squares
corresponded to less likely dice rolls. Finally, participants were given the chance to practice the
“Investment Scenario” in two practice rounds. The researcher emphasized these practice rounds
would not affect the participant or the participant’s partner and was simply for the participant to
gain some experience with the scenario.
After the two practice rounds, the participant completed the “Investment Scenario” under
three conditions: (a) other-reward only, (b) self-reward versus other-reward and (c) self-reward
only. The order of the first two conditions was randomized, however, the self-reward only
condition was always the last condition completed by participants. The order of the self-reward
condition was not randomized because previous studies have found that individuals asked to
make decisions for themselves first, anchor subsequent responses for others to their decision for
themselves (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006). In each condition the broker and/or investor was given
the opportunity to earn entries into a raffle for three prizes of $50 at the end of the semester.
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The self-reward versus other reward condition was randomized with the other-reward
only condition, despite this condition involving participants making a decision involving
themselves, because this is the first study with such a condition. Therefore, it was unknown
whether participants would anchor future decisions to the decisions made in the self-reward
versus other reward condition. Additionally, this randomization process allowed us to examine
order effects.
Prior to each condition, the researcher gave the participant a sheet delineating the reward
structure of the condition (see Appendix H), for the participant to review while the researcher
explained the reward structure. Afterwards, the researcher administered a four-question
comprehension check in order to ensure the participant understood the reward structure for each
condition. The researcher asked the participant these questions verbally, noting the accuracy of
the participant’s response, and providing the participant with feedback on their accuracy. In
cases in which the participant answered a question incorrectly, the researcher explained the
correct answer.
In condition ‘A’, the broker was told the client was being given 12 raffle entries into a
raffle for three prizes of $50 to invest. The researcher explained that if the question
corresponding to the dice roll was answered correctly by the third participant the client would
earn an additional 6 raffle entries if the question was easy or 12 if the question was hard.
However, the participant was also told that if the third participant answered a question
incorrectly, the client would lose all 12 of his/her raffle entries regardless of the difficulty of the
question. In this condition, the less risky choice for the client was to set up the board with easy
rather than hard questions.
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In condition ‘B’, the broker was told the client was being given 12 raffle entries into a
raffle for three prizes of $50 to invest. Again, the researcher explained that if the third
participant answered the question correctly, the client would earn an additional 6 raffle entries if
the question was easy or an additional 12 raffle entries if it was a hard question. Yet, if the
question was answered incorrectly the client would lose all 12 raffle entries. The difference
between conditions ‘A’ and ‘B’ was that in condition ‘B’ the broker was told s/he would earn
one raffle entry for every easy question on the board and two raffle entries for every hard
question on the board, regardless of whether the question is answered correctly. In this
condition, the client benefited from the board being set up with easy rather than hard questions,
whereas the broker benefited from the board being set up with hard rather than easy questions.
In condition ‘C’, the broker was told they were being given 12 raffle entries into a raffle
for three prizes of $50 to invest. They were told that they would be rewarded the way their client
was in the previous rounds. Specifically, participants were told that if the third participant
answered the question correctly, the participant would earn an additional 6 raffle entries for easy
question or an additional 12 raffle entries for a hard question. Again, however, if the question
was answered incorrectly they would lose all 12 of their raffle entries. In this condition, the
broker benefits from the board being set up with easy rather than hard questions.
Upon completing the three conditions, the participant was taken to one of three
computers in the hallway of the experimental suite. Tri-fold cardboard posters were placed
vertically between the computers to separate the participants. The participant then completed a
survey on the online survey platform Qualtrics. First, the participant completed the Dark Triad
personality measures (i.e., SRP-SF, NPI-13, and Mach-IV), a measure of subjective numeracy
(i.e., SNS), and a measure of empathy (i.e., EQ) in a randomized order. Participants then
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completed a measure of objective numeracy; they were provided a calculator, pen, and piece of
paper to use if they needed.
After completing the objective numeracy questionnaire, participants completed the
interpersonal closeness measure (i.e., IOS) as well as several questions including: (a) their
perception of the likelihood of themselves/their client winning the raffle (0% - 100%), (b) their
perception of the importance of the raffle money to their partner on a 7-poing Likert-type scale
from 1(Not at all Important) to 7(Extremely Important), (c) the importance of the raffle money to
themselves on a 7-poing Likert-type scale from 1(Not at all Important) to 7(Extremely
Important), (d) whether they were award they were playing for raffle entries for an actual raffle, I
whether they knew their client before the study, and (f) whether they heard anything about the
study before participating. Finally, participants completed demographics questions, were
debriefed, and thanked for their participation.
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Chapter 3: Results
3.1 BONDING MANIPULATION CHECKS
In order to verify that the bonding manipulation used in this study was effective, I
compared participants’ self-rated closeness to their partner (i.e., IOS scores) for those assigned to
the bonding condition (n = 60) to those assigned to the neutral condition (n = 66). This analysis
indicated that participants assigned to the bonding condition (M = 3.48; SD = 1.93) reported
themselves as being closer to their partner than those assigned to the neutral condition (M = 2.12;
SD = 1.45), 𝜒 2 (6) = 21.957, p < 0.001, d = 0.80.
The effect of the number of questions completed by participants in the bonding condition
on perceived closeness was also examined using a one-way ANOVA. These results indicated
that the number of questions completed by participants did not significantly affect participants’
perceived closeness to their partner, F(6, 27) = 0.614, p = 0.717.
3.2 INDICES OF BOARD DIFFICULTY
Twelve indices of board difficulty were created to examine differences in decisionmaking within and across conditions (Table 3).
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Table 3: Description of Dependent Variables
Dependent
Variable
No. Hard Cards
A
No. Hard Cards
B
No. Hard Cards
C
Board Difficulty
A
Board Difficulty
B
Board Difficulty
C
No. Hard Cards
A to C
No. Hard Cards
A to B
No. Hard Cards
B to C

Board Difficulty
A to C

Board Difficulty
A to B

Board Difficulty
B to C

Description
# of hard cards on the investment board in condition A
# of hard cards on the investment board in condition B
# of hard cards on the investment board in condition C
The sum of the probability of each board space with a hard card on the investment board
in condition A being selected
The sum of the probability of each board space with a hard card on the investment board
in condition B being selected
The sum of the probability of each board space with a hard card on the investment board
in condition C being selected
# of hard cards on the investment board in condition A minus # of hard cards on the
investment board in condition C
(positive numbers indicate greater difficulty in condition A compared to condition C)
# of hard cards on the investment board in condition A minus # of hard cards on the
investment board in condition B
(positive numbers indicate greater difficulty in condition A compared to condition B)
# of hard cards on the investment board in condition B minus # of hard cards on the
investment board in condition C
(positive numbers indicate greater difficulty in condition B compared to condition C)
The sum of the probability of each board space with a hard card on the investment board
in condition A being selected minus the sum of the probability of each board space with
a hard card on the investment board in condition C being selected
(positive numbers indicate greater difficulty in condition A compared to condition C)
The sum of the probability of each board space with a hard card on the investment board
in condition A being selected minus the sum of the probability of each board space with
a hard card on the investment board in condition C being selected
(positive numbers indicate greater difficulty in condition A compared to condition B)
The sum of the probability of each board space with a hard card on the investment board
in condition A being selected minus the sum of the probability of each board space with
a hard card on the investment board in condition C being selected
(positive numbers indicate greater difficulty in condition B compared to condition C)

43

First, the number of hard cards placed on the board for each condition was examined.
These variables represent the number of hard cards the participant placed on the investment
board in each condition: No. Hard Cards A, No. Hard Cards B., and No. Hard Cards C.
As individuals might have considered the likelihood of each space on the board being
selected when setting up the board, I also examined the difficulty of the card placed on each
space in conjunction with the probability of the board space being selected. Specifically, I
multiplied the probability of each board space being selected by the difficulty of the card placed
on the space (e.g., 1 for hard cards and 0 for easy cards). These variables therefore represented
the sum of the probability of each board space on which the participant placed a hard card being
selected: Board Difficulty A, Board Difficulty B, and Board Difficulty C.
Additionally, I wanted to examine the difference in board difficulties between conditions;
for example, whether the participant made the board more difficult (i.e., placed more hard cards)
when s/he would benefit from greater board difficulty than when s/he would benefit from less
board difficulty. Therefore, I first created variables to examine the difference between the
numbers of hard cards placed on the board in each condition. These variables were created by
subtracting the number of hard cards placed on the board by the participant in condition X from
the number of hard cards placed on the board by the participant in condition Y: No. Hard Cards
A to C, No. Hard Cards A to B, and No. Hard Cards B to C. I also examined the difference in
the difficulty of the boards between conditions. These variables were created by subtracting the
difficulty of the investment board created by the participant in condition X from the difficulty of
the investment board created by the participant in condition Y: Board Difficulty A to C, Board
Difficulty A to B, and Board Difficulty B to C. The means, standard deviations, minimums and
maximums of these variables are reported in Table 4.
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics of Dependent Variables
Measure

Mean

SD

Minimum

Maximum

No. Hard A

3.056

2.274

0.000

11.000

No. Hard B

4.260

2.561

0.000

11.000

No. Hard C

2.607

2.455

0.000

11.000

Board Difficulty A

0.210

0.218

0.000

1.010

Board Difficulty B

0.303

0.242

0.000

0.900

Board Difficulty C

0.172

0.226

0.000

1.010

No. Hard Cards A to C

0.426

2.739

-11.000

11.000

No. Hard Cards A to B

-1.198

2.977

-11.000

11.000

No. Hard Cards B to C

1.672

3.197

-8.000

11.000

Board Difficulty A to C

0.426

2.739

-1.010

1.010

Board Difficulty A to B

-1.198

2.977

-0.900

0.900

Board Difficulty B to C

0.136

0.297

-0.890

0.900

3.3 ASSOCIATION AMONG VARIABLES
Similar to previous studies (e.g., Paulhus & Williams, 2002) the Dark Triad personality
traits were significantly correlated with each other (Table 5).
Table 5: Correlations between Self-report Measures
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

-

0.480*

0.602*

0.198*

0.135

-0.417*

2. Narcissism

0.480*

-

0.314*

0.108

0.143*

-0.254*

3. Machiavellianism

0.602*

0.314*

-

0.171+

0.105

-0.177*

4. Obj. Numeracy

0.198*

0.108

0.171+

-

0.548*

0.123

5. Subj. Numeracy

0.135

0.143*

0.105

0.548*

-

0.073

-0.417*

-0.254*

-0.177*

0.123

0.073

-

1. Psychopathy

6. Empathy
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Additionally, the Dark Triad personality traits were significantly, negatively correlated
with empathy. There was also a significant correlation between narcissism and subjective
numeracy scores, as well as between psychopathy and objective numeracy scores.
Machiavellianism was marginally correlated with objective numeracy scores. Moreover,
objective and subjective numeracy were positively correlated with each other. The association
among the dependent variables was also examined with the majority of the dependent variables
being highly correlated with each other (Table 6).
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Table 6: Correlations between Dependent Variables

1. No. Hard A
2. No. Hard B
3. No. Hard C
4. Board
Difficulty A
5. Board
Difficulty B
6. Board
Difficulty C
7. No. Hard
Cards
A to C
8. No. Hard
Cards
A to B
9. No. Hard
Cards
B to C
10. Board
Difficulty A to C
11. Board
Difficulty A to B
12. Board
Difficulty B to C
*p > 0.05

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.

0.249*
0.338*

0.249*
0.198*

0.338*
0.198*
-

0.910*
0.214*
0.258*

0.361*
0.895*
0.208*

0.263*
0.156
0.918*

0.537*
0.040
-0.613*

-0.049
-0.673*
0.088

-0.049
0.659*
-0.607*

0.524*
0.051
-0.545*

0.425*
-0.644*
0.025

0.106
0.625*
-0.529*

0.910*

0.214*

0.258*

-

0.348*

0.233*

0.538*

0.514*

-0.023

0.613*

0.512*

0.109

0.361*

0.895*

0.208*

0.348*

-

0.206*

0.132

-0.495*

0.570*

0.117

-0.627*

0.667*

0.263*

0.156

0.918*

0.233*

0.206*

-

-0.589*

0.067

-0.568*

-0.625*

0.012

-0.591*

0.537*

0.040

-0.613*

0.538*

0.132

-0.589*

-

0.379*

0.503*

0.923*

0.335*

0.556*

0.549*

-0.673*

0.088

0.514*

-0.495*

0.067

0.379*

-

-0.609*

0.361

0.897*

-0.464*

-0.049

0.659*

-0.607*

-0.023

0.570*

-0.568*

0.503*

-0.609*

-

0.406*

-0.536*

0.912*

0.524*

0.051

-0.545*

0.613*

0.117

-0.625*

0.923*

0.361*

0.406*

-

0.406*

0.571*

0.425*

-0.644*

0.025

0.512*

-0.627*

0.012

0.335*

0.897*

-0.536*

0.406*

-

-0.518*

0.106

0.625*

-0.529*

0.109

0.667*

-0.591*

0.556*

-0.464*

0.912*

0.571*

-0.518*

-

47

The correlation between the independent and dependent variables was assessed as well.
There were marginally significant relationships between psychopathy and the number of hard
cards placed on the board by participants in condition B, as well as the difficulty of the board in
condition B (Table 7). Narcissism was positively correlated with multiple of the dependent
variables including: (1) placing more hard cards on the investment board in condition B, (2)
making the board more difficult in condition B, (3) placing more hard cards on the board in
condition B than in condition A, (4) placing more hard cards on the board in condition B than in
condition C, (5) making the board more difficult in condition B than in condition A, and (6)
making the board more difficult in condition B than in condition C. There were no significant
correlations between Machiavellianism or objective numeracy and any of the dependent
variables. There was however a significant relationship between subjective numeracy and
placing more difficult cards on the board in condition C than in condition A and making the
board more difficult in condition C than in condition A. Also, empathy was correlated with
placing fewer hard cards on the board in condition B.
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Table 7: Correlations between Self-report and Dependent Variables

1. No. Hard A
2. No. Hard B
3. No. Hard C
4. Board
Difficulty A
5. Board
Difficulty B
6. Board
Difficulty C
7. No. Hard
Cards A to C
8. No. Hard
Cards A to B
9. No. Hard
Cards B to C
10. Board
Difficulty A to C
11. Board
Difficulty A to B
12. Board
Difficulty B to C

1. Psych.

2. Narc.

3. Mach.

5. Subj.
Num.
-0.119
0.064
0.127

6. Emp.

0.012
0.086
-0.011

4. Obj.
Num.
-0.124
-0.059
0.046

-0.003
0.157+
-0.003

0.000
0.269*
-0.106

0.064

0.038

0.040

-0.082

-0.090

-0.148

0.171+

0.288*

0.141

0.007

0.040

-0.126

0.034

-0.010

-0.032

0.092

0.149

-0.058

0.007

0.096

0.021

-0.155

-0.207*

-0.074

-0.138

-0.232*

-0.066

-0.046

-0.147

0.072

0.134

0.303*

0.087

-0.085

-0.065

-0.137

0.018

0.050

0.043

-0.147

-0.202*

-0.082

-0.118

-0.222*

-0.114

-0.081

-0.114

-0.004

0.120

0.249*

0.140

-0.059

-0.100

-0.089

-0.124
-0.194*
-0.039

3.4 DIFFERENCES IN DECISION-MAKING BETWEEN CONDITIONS
To test the first hypothesis that individuals would make riskier decisions for the other
person when there were self- and other-reward asymmetries compared to when there were only
other-rewards or only self-rewards (H1) two repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted. For
the first repeated measures ANOVA, the number of hard cards placed on the investment board
during each condition were analyzed as the repeated measure. The results indicated that there
was a significant difference in the number of hard cards placed on the investment board by
participants in the three different conditions, F(2, 232) = 14.422, p < 0.001. In support of the
first hypothesis, participants placed significantly more hard cards on the board in condition B
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(i.e., self- and other-reward asymmetry) than in conditions A (i.e., other-reward) or condition C
(i.e., self-reward) (Figure 1). There was not a significant difference in the number of hard cards
placed on the investment board by participants in condition A and condition C.

5
4.5
4
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0

4.14
3.22

No. Hard A

2.67

No. Hard B

No. Hard C

Figure 1. Average number of hard cards placed on the board in each condition with standard
error bars.
The second repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to examine the differences in
board difficulty (i.e., higher difficulty means a greater probability of a hard card being chosen)
between conditions. This analysis indicated that there was a significant difference in the
difficulty of the investment board set up by participants in each condition, F(2, 224) = 10.295, p
< 0.001. Also providing support for the first hypothesis, participants set up the board to be
significantly more difficult in condition B as compared to condition C; the difficulty of the board
did not differ between conditions A and C or between conditions A and B (Figure 2).
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0.35
0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15
0.1

0.30
0.23
0.18

0.05
0
Board Difficulty A

Board Difficulty B

Board Difficulty C

Figure 2. Average board difficulty in each condition with standard error bars.
The effects of interpersonal closeness and the order of decisions on these participants’
choices were examined as between subjects variables in both repeated measures ANOVAs. It
was hypothesized that individuals who bonded with the other person would make less risky
decisions for the other person in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry
conditions compared to those who did not bond with the other person (H2). This hypothesis was
not supported. Specifically, there was not a significant interaction between activity and the order
of conditions on the number of hard cards placed on the board across conditions, F(2, 232) =
0.657, p = 0.519. There was also not a significant interaction between the activity participants
engaged in (i.e., bonding or neutral) and the number of hard cards placed on the board across
conditions, F(2, 232) = 0.801, p = 0.450.
However, the hypothesis that the order of conditions would affect participants’ decisions
such that those who completed the self- and other-reward asymmetry condition first were
expected to anchor their subsequent decision in the other-reward only condition to their decision
in the self- and other-reward asymmetry condition (H3) was supported. Specifically, there was a
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significant interaction between the order of conditions and the number of hard cards placed on
the investment board by participants in each condition, F(2, 232) = 6.974, p = 0.001. Those
assigned to complete condition A (i.e., self-reward) before condition B (i.e., self- and otherreward asymmetry) placed significantly fewer hard cards on the investment board in conditions
A and C (i.e., self-reward) than in condition B (Figure 3). The number of hard cards placed on
the board by participants in conditions A and C did not significantly differ. Also, participants
assigned to complete condition A first placed significantly fewer hard cards on the board in
condition A than did participants assigned to complete condition B first. However, those
assigned to complete condition B first did not place a significantly different number of hard
cards on the investment board in any one condition

6
5

4.47
3.91

4
3

3.82
2.65

2.53

2.69

A first
B first

2
1

0
No. Hard A

No. Hard B

No. Hard C

Figure 3. Average number of hard cards placed on the board in each condition separated by the
order of conditions.
Additionally, there was again a significant interaction between board difficulty and the
order of conditions, F(2, 224) = 7.667, p = .001. Participants assigned to complete condition A
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first set up the investment board to be significantly more difficult in condition B than in
conditions A or C (Figure 4). Among these participants there was not a significant difference in
board difficulty for conditions A and C. Moreover, those assigned to complete condition A first
set up a significantly less difficult investment board for condition A than did those assigned to
complete condition B first. However, those assigned to complete condition B first did not set up
significantly more or less difficult boards in any of the conditions.
0.4
0.35

0.32

0.31

0.29

0.3
0.25
0.2
0.15

0.17

0.14

0.19

A first
B first

0.1
0.05
0
Board Difficulty A

Board Difficulty B

Board Difficulty C

Figure 4. Average board difficulty in each condition separated by the order of conditions.
3.5 EFFECT OF DARK TRIAD VARIABLES
One of the primary goals of this project was to examine the effect of Dark Triad variables
on decision making for oneself versus others. Each of these traits was hypothesized to be
associated with making more self-centered choices. However, it was predicted that those higher
in narcissism would make less selfish decisions when they bonded with the other person than
when they engaged in a neutral activity. In order to test these hypotheses, three separate
regressions were conducted to determine the effect of the Dark Triad traits on participants’
decisions in each condition. The regressions were conducted separately due to concerns
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regarding the interpretability of findings resulting from analyses in which the shared variance
among the independent variables is removed from the analysis (Lynam, Hoyle & Newman,
2006). As the Dark Triad are all highly correlated with each other (Table 5), it has been argued
that regressions in which all three traits are included result in findings that no longer reflect the
constructs of interest (Lynam et al., 2006). In order to avoid this problem, the effect of each
Dark Triad trait was considered separately.
The activity participants completed (i.e., bonding or neutral) was included in each
regression with activity being effects coded (i.e., bonding = 1; neutral = -1). Additionally, the
effect of objective numeracy and subjective numeracy were included in the regressions
examining the effect of psychopathy and narcissism, respectively. This is due to the significant
correlation between these variables, indicating a potential interaction between the Dark Triad
traits and numeracy (Table 5). Given the potential of an interaction between these variables, all
interactions between the independent variables were examined in the regressions discussed
below. All interactions were included as including only select interactions results in a bias
towards the included interactions being significant.
3.4.1 Narcissism
The effect of narcissism on participants’ decisions across condition was examined using a
series of linear regressions. The hypothesis that those higher in narcissism would make riskier
decisions for others in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions (H4)
was partially supported. In support of this hypothesis, those higher in narcissism placed more
hard cards on the board in condition B (i.e., self- and other-reward asymmetry) and made the
board more difficult in condition B (Table 8). However, in contrast to our hypothesis, there was
not a significant relationship between narcissism and the number of hard cards placed on the
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board in condition A or board difficulty in condition A. There were, however, several nonhypothesized significant interactions between narcissism and subjective numeracy, which
suggest an effect of narcissism on the riskiness of the board in conditions A and B among those
higher in subjective numeracy.
Additionally, the hypothesis that those higher in narcissism who bonded with the other
person would make less risky decisions for the other person in the other-reward and self- and
other-reward asymmetry conditions than those higher in narcissism who did not bond with their
partner (H5) was not supported. Specifically, none of the interactions between narcissism and
condition were supported (Table 8; Table 9). However, there were several non-hypothesized
interactions between narcissism, condition, and subjective numeracy, which suggested an effect
of condition on narcissism only among those high in subjective numeracy.
The non-hypothesized significant interactions between narcissism and subjective
numeracy, as well as narcissism, subjective numeracy, and condition are examined below.
Specifically, analysis indicated a significant effect of narcissism such that those higher in
narcissism placed more hard cards on the board in condition B compared to conditions A and C
and made the board more difficult in condition B compared to condition C (Table 8; Table 9).
There was also a marginally significant effect indicating those higher in narcissism placed more
hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition C and made the board more
difficult in condition B than in condition A (Table 9).
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Table 8: Regression of Narcissism on Risk for Each Scenario
Board

Board

Board

Difficulty A

Difficulty B

Difficulty C

-.121[-.304,

.098[-.078,

.287[.113,

-.027[-.212,

.438]*

.063]

.274]

.462]*

.158]

-.178[-.356,

.004[-.172,

.134[-.056,

-.153[-.332,

-.020[-.198,

.141[-.054,

.000]*

.179]

.325]

.026]

.158]

.337]

.188[.013,

-.065[-.237,

-.036[-.221,

.141[-.035,

-.026[-.201,

-.047[-.234,

.362]*

.106]

.149]

.317]

.149]

.141]

.008[-.167,

-.036[-.209,

-.107[-.291,

-.026[-.202,

-.068[-.242,

-.135[-.319,

.184]

.137]

.076]

.151]

.106]

.050]

Narc*Subj.

.106[-.069,

-.084[-.256,

.009[-.174,

.124[-.051,

-.086[-.260,

.036[-.149,

Numeracy

.280]

.089]

.192]

.300]

.087]

.221]

.073[-.105,

.143[-.033,

.014[-.177,

.094[-.085,

.116[-.062,

.000[-.195,

.251]

.318]

.204]

.273]

.294]

.196]

-.271[-.446,

-.158[-.331,

-.078[-.260,

-.280[-.455,

-.159[-.333,

-.097[-.282,

-.096]*

.015]+

.105]

-.104]*

.015]+

.087]

Narcissism

Subj. Numeracy

Condition

Narc*Condition

Condition*Subj.
Numeracy

Narc*Cond*Subj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

No. Hard A

No. Hard B

No. Hard C

.070[-.106,

.264[.091,

.245]

+p < .090
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Table 9: Regression of Narcissism on Risk Differences between Each Scenarios
No. Hard

No. Hard

No. Hard

Board

Board

Board

Cards

Cards

Cards

Difficulty

Difficulty

Difficulty

A to C

A to B

B to C

A to C

A to B

B to C

.165[-.011,

-.175[-.347,

.314[.138,

.109[-.072,

-.175[-.352,

.266[.087,

.341]+

-.002]*

.489]*

.289]

.001]+

.455]*

-.263[-.446,

-.140[-.315,

-.121[-.303,

-.245[-.437,

-.111[-.291,

-.138[-.328,

-.081]*

.036]

.060]

-.054]*

.070]

.052]

.179[.022,

.203[.031,

-.023[-.200,

.140[-.044,

.130[-.047,

.016[-.166,

.357]*

.375]*

.154]

.324]

.307]

.198]

.098[-.078,

.037[-.136,

.059[-.177,

.094[-.087,

.048[-.128,

.050[-.130,

.274]

.210]

.234]

.274]

.225]

.229]

Narc*Subj.

.083[-.093,

.152[-.020,

-.082[-.256,

.071[-.110,

.186[.010,

-.107[-.286,

Numeracy

.258]

.324]+

.093]

.251]

.362]*

.072]

.055[-.128,

-.068[-.243,

.085[-.096,

.066[-.126,

-.031[-.211,

.085[-.105,

.237]

.107]

.267]

.258]

.150]

.275]

-.152[-.327,

-.072[-.244,

-.073[-.248,

-.136[-.316,

-.081[-.257,

-.062[-.241,

.024]+

.100]

.101]

.044]

.094]

.118]

Narcissism

Subj. Numeracy

Condition

Narc*Condition

Condition*Subj.
Numeracy

Narc*Cond*Subj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

+p < .090

Additionally, there were two significant two-way interactions between narcissism and
subjective numeracy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared
to condition B and the difficulty of the board in condition A compared to condition B (Table 9).
Expressly, those lower in narcissism, who were also lower in subjective numeracy tended to
place more hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition B than did those lower
in narcissism who were higher in subjective numeracy (Figure 5). However, subjective
numeracy did not seem to affect the difference in the number of hard cards on the board in
condition A compared to condition B for those higher in narcissism (Figure 5).
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Figure 5. Interaction between subjective numeracy and narcissism on the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition B
(self- and other-reward asymmetry)
Further, narcissism levels did not appear to affect the difference in board difficulty
between conditions A and B among those high in subjective numeracy (Figure 6). Yet, among
those lower in narcissism, those also lower in subjective numeracy made the board more difficult
in condition A compared to condition B compared to those higher in subjective numeracy
(Figure 6). However, for those higher in narcissism, there did not appear to be a difference in
board difficulty between conditions A and B based on subjective numeracy (Figure 6).
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Figure 6. Interaction between subjective numeracy and narcissism on difficulty of the board in
condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition B (self- and other-reward
asymmetry)
There was also a significant three-way interaction between narcissism, subjective
numeracy, and whether participants bonded with their partner or not, on the number of hard
cards placed on the board in condition A and the difficulty of the board in condition A (Table 8).
Expressly, among those lower in narcissism, those higher in subjective numeracy who bonded
with their partner tended to place fewer hard cards on the board in condition A than did those
lower in subjective numeracy who bonded with their partner (Figure 7). However, this trend was
reversed among those higher in narcissism (Figure 7).
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Figure 7. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), subjective
numeracy and narcissism on the number of cards placed on the board in condition A
(other-reward only)
For board difficulty in condition A, among those lower in narcissism participants who did
not bond with their partner and had lower subjective numeracy made the board more difficult
than those who were high in subjective numeracy and did not bond with their partner (Figure 8).
However among those higher in narcissism, this trend was reversed (Figure 8). Furthermore,
among those higher in narcissism who bonded with their partner, those higher in subjective
numeracy made the board less difficult than did those lower in subjective numeracy (Figure 8).
Yet, among those lower in narcissism who bonded with their partner, those higher in subjective
numeracy made the board more difficult than those lower in subjective numeracy (Figure 8).
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Figure 8. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), subjective
numeracy and narcissism on difficulty of the board in condition A (other-reward
only)
Three other three-way interactions between narcissism, subjective numeracy, and activity
completed by participants (i.e., bonding or neutral) were marginally significant. Those higher in
subjective numeracy and narcissism who bonded with their partner tended to place fewer hard
cards on the board in condition B than did those lower in subjective numeracy or those higher in
subjective numeracy who did not bond with their partner (Table 8; Figure 9). This same trend
was seen for the difficulty of the board in condition B (Table 8; Figure 10).
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Figure 9. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), subjective
numeracy and narcissism on the number of hard cards placed on the board in
condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry)
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Figure 10. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), subjective
numeracy and narcissism on difficulty of the board in condition B (self- and otherreward asymmetry)
A significant three-way interaction between narcissism, subjective numeracy and
condition was also observed for the difference in the number of hard cards placed on the board in
condition A compared to condition C (Table 9). Specifically, among those higher in narcissism,
those with lower subjective numeracy, who did not bond with their partner, placed fewer hard
cards on the board in condition A than in condition C compared to those higher in subjective
numeracy who did bond with their partner (Figure 11). Yet, this trend was reversed among those
lower in narcissism (Figure 11). Additionally, among those higher in narcissism, those lower in
subjective numeracy, who bonded with their partner tended to place more hard cards on the
board in condition A compared to condition C than did those lower in subjective numeracy who
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did not bond with their partner (Figure 11). However, among those lower in narcissism, those
lower in subjective numeracy who did not bond with their partner placed more hard cards on the
board in condition A compared to condition C than did those higher in subjective numeracy who
bonded with their partner (Figure 11).

Figure 11. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), subjective
numeracy and narcissism on the number of hard cards placed on the board in
condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition C (self-reward only)
Subjective numeracy also significantly affected several of the outcome variables; those
higher in subjective numeracy placed fewer hard cards on the board in condition A (Table 8) and
placed fewer hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition C (Table 9). Those
higher in subjective numeracy also made the board significantly more difficult in condition A
compared to condition C (Table 9). The activity participants completed was also significantly
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related to the outcome variables such that those in the bonding condition placed more hard cards
on the board in condition A (Table 8) and placed more hard cards on the board in condition A
compared to conditions C and B (Table 9). However, those in the bonding condition placed
more hard cards on the board in condition B than in condition A (Table 9). There was not a
significant interaction between the activity completed by participants and subjective numeracy
on any of the outcome variables (Table 8; Table 9). The interaction between narcissism and
activity completed by participants was also not significant (Table 8; Table 9).
3.4.2 Psychopathy
The effect of psychopathy was considered in a series of linear regressions in which
psychopathy, objective numeracy, the activity participants completed (i.e., bonding or neutral)
and the interactions between these variables were entered as independent variables. The
hypothesis that those higher in psychopathy would make riskier decisions for others in the otherreward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions regardless of whether they bonded with
the other person (H6) was partially supported. Specifically, these analyses indicated there was a
marginally significant effect of psychopathy such that those higher in psychopathy tended to
place more hard cards on the board in condition B (i.e., self- versus other-reward) and to make
the board more difficult in condition B (Table 10). Further, in-line with the hypothesis, there
was not a significant interaction between psychopathy and condition for any of the dependent
variables. However, in contrast to the hypothesis, there was not a significant effect of
psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A or the board
difficulty in condition A (Table 10).

65

Table 10: Regression of Psychopathy on Risk for Each Scenario

Psychopathy

Obj. Numeracy

Condition

Psych*Condition
Psych* Obj.
Numeracy
Condition*Obj.
Numeracy
Psych*Cond*Obj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

No. Hard A

No. Hard B

No. Hard C

.016[-.160,

.163[-.013,

.003[-.185,

+

Board

Board

Board

Difficulty A

Difficulty B

Difficulty C

.085[-.095,

.164[-.016,

.032[-.156,

+

.193]

.340]

.190]

.264]

.345]

.220]

-.118[-.306,

-.040[-.227,

-.004[-.207,

-.083[-.274,

.030[-.163,

.030[-.172,

.070]

.147]

.198]

.109]

.224]

.233]

.191[.015,

-.104[-.280,

-.046[-.234,

.122[-.059,

-.074[-.254,

-.069[-.258,

.368]*

.072]

.143]

.302]

.105]

.121]

.016[-.160,

-.126[-.302,

.017[-.170,

-.011[-.190,

-.139[-.320,

.001[-.188,

.193]

.051]

.204]

.168]

.042]

.189]

-.139[-.329,

.130[-.060,

-.129[-.330,

-.156[-.350,

.084[-.110,

-.165[-.366,

.051]

.320]

.072]

.037]

.278]

.036]

.043[-.145,

.087[-.100,

-.067[-.269,

.107[-.350,

.129[-.064,

-.053[-.256,

.231]

.274]

.135]

.037]

.323]

.149]

-.238[-.429,

-.106[-.296,

.031[-.170,

-.150[-.343,

-.083[-.276,

.014[-.187,

-.048]*

.084]

.232]

.044]

.111]

.215]

+p < .090

Nevertheless, there were two non-hypothesized significant interactions between
psychopathy, condition and objective numeracy on the number of hard cards in condition A and
the difference in the number of hard cards in condition A and C, which tend to suggest an effect
of bonding on decisions made by those high in psychopathy when participants objective
numeracy is considered (Table 10; Table 11). There were also several non-hypothesized
significant interactions between psychopathy and objective numeracy. These non-hypothesized
results are considered in more depth below.
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Table 11: Regression of Psychopathy on Risk Differences between Each Scenarios

Psychopathy

Obj. Numeracy

Condition

Psych*Condition
Psych* Obj.
Numeracy
Condition*Obj.
Numeracy

Psych*Cond*Obj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

No. Hard

No. Hard

No. Hard

Board

Board

Board

Cards

Cards

Cards

Difficulty

Difficulty

Difficulty

A to C

A to B

B to C

A to C

A to B

B to C

.017[-.163,

-.128[-.301,

.136[-.042,

.036[-.149,

-.096[-.277,

.117[-.065,

.196]

.046]

.315]

.222]

.084]

.299]

-.100[-.294,

-.060[-.245,

-.032[-.225,

-.093[-.292,

-.097[-.289,

.009[-.186,

.094]

.125]

.160]

.106]

.096]

.205]

.189[.008,

.239[.066,

-.051[-.230,

.138[-.050,

.158[-.022,

-.008[-.191,

.370]*

.413]*

.128]

.325]

.337]+

.175]

-.004[-.184,

.121[-.053,

-.117[-.295,

-.034[-.219,

.103[-.078,

-.130[-.312,

.175]

.295]

.061]

.151]

.283]

.052]

-.002[-.195,

-.219[-.406,

.202[.011,

-.007[-.204,

-.216[-.409,

.186[-.008,

.190]

-.032]*

.393]*

.190]

-.023]*

.380]+

.095[-.099,

-.047[-.232,

.125[-.067,

.137[-.062,

-.031[-.223,

.169[-.027,

.289]

.138]

.317]

.336]

.162]

.364]

-.221[-.414,

-.092[-.279,

-.100[-.291,

-.128[-.325,

-.057[-.250,

-.066[-.260,

-.028]*

.096]

.091]

.069]

.135]

.380]

+p < .090

There was a significant interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the
difference in the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition
B (Table 11). Psychopathy levels did not tend to affect the difference in the number of hard
cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition B among those higher in
objective numeracy (Figure 12). However, those lower in objective numeracy who were also
lower in psychopathy tended to place more hard cards on the board in condition A compared to
condition B than those lower in psychopathy who were higher in objective numeracy (Figure
12).
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Figure 12. Interaction between objective numeracy and psychopathy on the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition B
(self- and other-reward asymmetry)
Additionally, the interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the
difference in difficulty of the board in condition A compared to condition B was also significant
(Table 11). Among those lower in psychopathy, those higher in subjective numeracy placed
more hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition B than did those lower in
objective numeracy (Figure 13). However, this trend was reversed for those high in psychopathy
such that those lower in objective numeracy placed more hard cards on the board in condition A
compared to condition B than did those higher in objective numeracy (Figure 13).
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Figure 13. Interaction between objective numeracy and psychopathy on the difficulty of the
board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition B (self- and otherreward asymmetry)
The interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the difference in the
number of hard cards placed on the board in condition B compared to condition C was also
significant (Table 11). Specifically, among those lower in psychopathy, those with higher
objective numeracy tended to put fewer hard cards on the board in condition B than in condition
C compared to those lower in psychopathy and subjective numeracy (Figure 14). In contrast,
those lower in objective numeracy tended to place more hard cards on the board in condition B
than in condition C compared to those lower in objective numeracy, among those higher in
psychopathy (Figure 14).
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Figure 14. Interaction between objective numeracy and psychopathy on the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) compared to
condition C (self-reward only)
The psychopathy and objective numeracy interaction also had a marginally significant
effect on the difference in board difficulty between conditions B and C (Table 11). Those high in
objective numeracy and lower in psychopathy made the board more difficult in condition B
compared to condition C than did those lower in psychopathy and objective numeracy (Figure
15). However, among those higher in psychopathy, those with lower objective numeracy made
the board more difficult in condition B compared to condition C than did those higher in
objective numeracy (Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Interaction between objective numeracy and psychopathy on the difficulty of the
board in condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) compared to condition C
(self-reward only)
There were also two significant three-way interactions between psychopathy, objective
numeracy and condition. There was a significant effect of this interaction on the number of hard
cards placed on the board in condition A (Table 10). Specifically, those higher in psychopathy
and lower in objective numeracy, who bonded with their partner, placed significantly more hard
cards on the board in condition A compared to those higher in psychopathy who did not-bond
with their partner or had higher objective numeracy (Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Interaction between (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), objective
numeracy and psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in
condition A (other-reward only)
Similarly, there was also a significant three-way interaction on the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A compared to condition C (Table 11). Those who were higher
in psychopathy and lower in objective numeracy, who also bonded with their partner, tended to
place more hard cards on the board in condition A than in condition C when compared to those
high in psychopathy who were either did not bond with their partner or were higher in objective
numeracy (Figure 17). Additionally, those lower in psychopathy who did not bond with their
partner and were high in objective numeracy tended to place more hard cards on the board in
condition A compared to condition C than did those lower in psychopathy who did not bond with
their partner and were low in objective numeracy (Figure 17). However, among those high in
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psychopathy who did not bond with their partner, objective numeracy did not tend to affect the
difference in the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition
C (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Interaction between (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), objective
numeracy and psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in
condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition C (self-reward only)
These regressions also indicated a significant effect of condition such that those assigned
to the bonding condition placed significantly more hard cards on the board in condition A (Table
10). In fact, those assigned to the bonding condition placed significantly more hard cards on the
board in condition A than in conditions B or C (Table 11). There was also a marginally significant
effect such that those assigned to the bonding condition made the board significantly more difficult
in condition A than in condition B (Table 11). The effects of objective numeracy, the interaction
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between psychopathy and activity, and the interaction between activity and objective numeracy
were not significantly related to any of the outcome variables (Table 10; Table 11).
3.4.3 Machiavellianism
The hypothesis that those higher in Machiavellianism would make riskier decisions for
others in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions regardless of
whether they bonded with the other person (H7) was partially supported. In contrast to our
hypothesis, the results indicated there was not a significant effect of Machiavellianism on
participants’ decisions across conditions (Table 12; Table 13). However, supporting our
hypothesis, there was not a significant interaction between Machiavellianism and bonding on any
of the decisions (Table 12; Table 13).
There was, however, a marginally significant effect of condition such that those who
bonded with their partner placed more hard cards on the board in condition A (Table 12).
Additionally, those assigned to the bonding condition placed significantly more hard cards on the
board in condition A than in condition B (Table 13).
Table 12: Regression of Machiavellianism on Risk for Each Scenario
Board

Board

Board

Difficulty A

Difficulty B

Difficulty C

-.018[-.199,

.043[-.136,

.145[-.036,

-.037[-.225,

.272]

.162]

.222]

.325]

.152]

.153[-.023,

-.123[-.298,

-.034[-.216,

.103[-.076,

-.087[-.265,

-.059[-.243,

.330]+

.051]

.148]

.282]

.090]

.126]

-.053[-.231,

-.140[-.316,

.058[-.122,

.002[-.177,

-.111[-.291,

.064[-.124,

.125]

.036]

.239]

.181]

.070]

.252]

No. Hard A

No. Hard B

No. Hard C

.023[-.154,

.096[-.080,

.201]

Machiavellianism

Condition

Mach*Condition

*p < .05

+p < .090
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Table 13: Regression of Machiavellianism on Risk Differences Between Each Scenarios
No. Hard
Cards
A to C
.036[-.142,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
-.066[-.240,

No. Hard
Cards
B to C
.099[-.078,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
.051[-.136,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
-.111[-.292,

Board
Difficulty
B to C
.144[-.041,

.214]

.108]

.277]

.239]

.069]

.329]

.146[-.033,

.226[.052,

-.072[-.251,

.116[-.068,

.152[-.026,

-.022[-.204,

.326]

.399]*

.107]

.301]

.330]

.159]

-.098[-.276,

.078[-.096,

-.150[-.328,

-.067[-.254,

.089[-.091,

-.147[-.332,

.080]

.253]

.027]

.120]

.270]

.038]

Machiavellianism

Condition

Mach*Condition

*p < .05

+p < .090

3.6 EFFECT OF DARK TRIAD VARIABLES BY ORDER OF CONDITIONS
As the order participants were assigned to complete the three conditions significantly
affected the number of hard cards on the investment board and difficulty of the investment board
I wanted to probe any potential effect of order on the relationship between the Dark Triad
variables and decision making across conditions. As such, I examined the effect of the Dark
Triad variables on the dependent variables separately for those assigned to complete condition A
first (n = 73) and for those assigned to complete condition B first (n = 49). However, I only
conducted regressions for outcome variables involving condition A, as this was the only
condition for which a significant difference was exhibited based on the order of conditions.
Additionally, it should be noted that these analyses are underpowered and post-hoc examinations
of the data; any interpretations based on these results should be tempered accordingly.
3.6.1 Condition A First
Again three separate linear regressions were conducted to examine the effect of the Dark
Triad traits. In the regression examining the effect of narcissism, there was a significant effect of
narcissism such that those higher in narcissism placed more hard cards on the board in condition
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B compared to condition A (Table 14). Those higher in narcissism also made the board
significantly more difficult in condition B compared to condition A (Table 14). There was also a
significant three-way interaction between narcissism, subjective numeracy and whether
participants bonded with their partner on the difficulty of the board in condition A (Table 14).
Table 14: Regression of Narcissism on Risk for those who completed Condition A First

.232[-.034,

No. Hard
Cards
A to C
.175[-.092,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
-.318[-.564,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
.177[-.111,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
-.328[-.580,

.399]

.498]

.442]

-.073]*

.465]

-.076]*

-.167[-.479,

-.175[-.479,

-.320[-.626,

-.112[-.392,

-.246, -.605,

.034[-.254,

.145]

.129]

-.015]*

.168]

.113]

.323]

.185[-.080,

.148[-.110,

.167[-.096,

.210[-.028,

.151[-.141,

.102[-.145,

.450]

.406]

.429]

.448]+

.442]

.350]

.037[-.236,

-.001[-.266.

-.003[-.270,

.118[-.127,

.051[-.237,

.095[-.157,

.310]

.265]

.265]

.363]

.339]

.347]

Narc*Subj.

.133[-.161,

.125[-.162,

.131[-.157,

.058[-.206,

.088[-.239,

.110[-.161,

Numeracy

.428]

.413]

.419]

.323]

.414]

.382]

.100[-.212,

.038[-.266,

.042[-.264,

-.129[-.409,

.023[-.337,

-.068[-.357,

.412]

.342]

.348]

.151]

.382]

.220]

-.175[-.470,

-.305[-.592,

-.168[-.456,

-.157[-.422,

-.189[-.516,

-.130[-.402,

.120]

-.018]*

.120]

.108]

.137]

.142]

Narcissism

Subj. Numeracy

Condition

Narc*Condition

Condition*Subj.
Numeracy
Narc*Cond*Subj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

No. Hard A

Board
Difficulty A

.126[-.147,

+p < .090

Specifically, among those higher in narcissism, those higher in subjective numeracy
made the board more difficult in condition A than did those lower in subjective numeracy
(Figure 18). However, among those lower in narcissism, those with lower subjective numeracy
who did not bond with their partner made the board more difficult than did those who bonded
with their partner or who did not bond with their partner but had higher subjective numeracy
(Figure 18). On the other hand, those higher in subjective numeracy who did not bond with their
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partner made the board more difficult in condition A than did participants who bonded with their
partner (Figure 18).

Figure 18. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition), subjective
numeracy and narcissism on difficulty of the board in condition A (other-reward
only) for participants who completed condition A first
The regression examining the effect of narcissism also revealed a marginal effect of
subjective numeracy such that those higher in subjective numeracy placed more hard cards on
the board in condition C compared to condition A (Table 14). There was also a marginal effect
of condition such that those who bonded with their partner placed more hard cards on the board
in condition A than in condition B (Table 14). There were no other significant effects in the
regressions focusing on the effect of narcissism.
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For the regression examining the effect of psychopathy, a marginally significant effect of
objective numeracy was found such that those higher in objective numeracy placed fewer hard
cards on the board in condition A (Table 15). There was also a marginally significant effect of
condition such that those who bonded with their partner placed fewer hard cards on the board in
condition A than in condition B (Table 15). The interaction between psychopathy and whether
participants bonded with their partner had a marginally significant effect on the difference in the
number of hard cards participants placed on the board in condition A compared to condition C
(Table 15).
Table 15: Regression of Psychopathy on Risk for those who completed Condition A First

Psychopathy

Obj. Numeracy

Condition

.079[-.232,

No. Hard
Cards
A to C
.006[-.286,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
-.044[-.342,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
.030[-.284,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
-.085[-.391,

.357]

.389]

.299]

.253]

.343]

.220]

-.286[-.595,

-.180[-.497,

-.193[-.498,

-.053[-.358,

-.114[-.446,

.024[-.296,

.023]+

.137]

.113]

.251]

.217]

.343]

.199[-.061,

.107[-.160,

.101[-.150,

.237[-.019,

.079[-.192,

.114[-.148,

.350]

.377]

No. Hard A

Board
Difficulty A

.054[-.249,

.458]

.373]

.352]

.492]+

-.023[-.325,

-.073[-.383,

-.259[-.551,

.228[-.070,

-.186[-.499,

.175[-.130,

.280]

.237]

.034]+

.526]

.128]

.481]

Psych*Obj.

-.186[-.521,

-.153[-.497,

.125[-.198,

-.085[-.414,

.136[-.211,

.001[-.335,

Numeracy

.149]

.190]

.448]

.244]

.483]

.336]

-.065[-.374,

.000[-.317,

.178[-.127,

-.051[-.356,

.119[-.212,

-.008[-.328,

.244]

.317]

.484]

.253]

.451]

.311]

-.270[-.605,

-.190[-.533,

-.033[-.356,

.049[-.280,

-.064[-.411,

.163[-.172,

.064]

.153]

.290]

.378]

.283]

.499]

Psych*Condition

Condition*Obj.
Numeracy
Psych*Cond*Obj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

+p < .090

Expressly, for those lower in psychopathy, those who bonded with their partner placed
more hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition C than did those who did not
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bond with their partner (Figure 19). However, among those higher in psychopathy, those who
did not bond with their partner placed more hard cards on the board in condition C compared to
condition A than did those who bonded with their partner (Figure 19). None of the other
variables entered into these regressions were significant.

Figure 19. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A (otherreward only) compared to condition C (self-reward only) for participants who
completed condition A first.
The effect of bonding on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A
compared to condition B was the only significant effect among the regressions examining the
effect of Machiavellianism (Table 16). Expressly, those who bonded with their partner placed
significantly fewer hard cards on the board in condition B than in condition A (Table 16).
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Table 16. Regression of Machiavellianism on Risk for those who Completed Condition A First

.096[-.162,

Board
Difficulty
A
.173[-.084,

No. Hard
Cards
A to C
.164[-.088,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
.029[-.223,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
.145[-.114,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
.023[-.237,

.353]

.431]

.416]

.282]

.403]

.282]

.145[-.100,

.075[-.169,

.121[-.119,

.254[.014,

.082[-.165,

.162[-.085,

.389]

.319]

.362]

.493]*

.329]

.409]

-.093[-.350,

-.044[-.302,

-.181[-.433,

.155[-.098,

-.182[-.440,

.143[-.117,

.164]

.213]

.071]

.408]

.076]

.403]

No. Hard A
Machiavellianism

Condition

Mach*Condition

*p < .05

+p < .090

3.6.2 Condition B First
Neither of the regressions examining the effect of Machiavellianism (Table 17) or
narcissism (Table 18) on the indices of board difficulty were significant.
Table 17: Regression of Machiavellianism on Risk for those who Completed Condition B First

-.043[-.426,

Board
Difficulty
A
-.056[-.438,

No. Hard
Cards
A to C
-.188[-.569,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
-.209[-.589,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
-.154[-.548,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
-.171[-.558,

.340]

.326]

.193]

.171]

.239]

.215]

-.046[-.352,

-.093[-.400,

.025[-.282,

.016[-.291,

-.003[-.319,

-.024[-.332,

.260]

.215]

.333]

.323]

.313]

.285]

-.018[-.401,

.069[-.314,

.092[-.289,

.155[-.225,

.128[-.266,

.112[-.274,

.365]

.451]

.473]

.536]

.521]

.449]

No. Hard A
Machiavellianism

Condition

Mach*Condition

*p < .05

+p < .090
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Table 18: Regression of Narcissism on Risk for those who Completed Condition B First

-.115[-.510,

No. Hard
Cards
A to C
-.134[-.560,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
-.067[-.463,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
-.201[-.646,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
-.122[-.515,

.320]

.280]

.291]

.328]

.245]

.272]

-.035[-.378,

-.008[-.349,

-.012[-.383,

-.109[-.451,

-.087[-.471,

-.187[-.536,

.307]

.333]

.360]

.233]

.296]

.162]

.020[-.336,

-.048[-.404,

-.059[-.441,

.045[-.311,

-.096[-.489,

-.036[-.399,

.377]

.307]

.322]

.401]

.298]

.327]

-.077[-.473,

-.075[-.470,

.025[-.400,

-.125[-.520,

.023[-.423,

-.089[-.482,

.318]

.321]

.451]

.270]

.468]

.305]

Narc*Subj.

.123[-.287,

.114[-.296,

.138[-.302,

.212[-.198,

.122[-.376,

.317[-.107,

Numeracy

.511]

.523]

.577]

.622]

.621]

.740]

.169[-.173,

.213[-.128,

.157[-.215,

-.091[-.433,

.152[-.232,

-.015[-.365,

.511]

.554]

.528]

.251]

.536]

.334]

-.232[-.642,

-.189[-.599,

.116[-.323,

-.050[-.460,

.138[-.360,

-.067[-.491,

.178]

.220]

.556]

.360]

.636]

.356]

No. Hard A

Board
Difficulty A

-.076[-.471,
Narcissism

Subj. Numeracy

Condition

Narc*Condition

Condition*Subj.
Numeracy
Narc*Cond*Subj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

+p < .090

However, the regression examining the effect of psychopathy indicated a significant
effect such that those higher in psychopathy placed fewer hard cards on the board in condition A,
placed more hard cards on the board in conditions C compared to condition A, placed more hard
cards on the board in condition B than in condition A, and made the board more difficult in
condition C than in condition A (Table 19). There was also a significant interaction between
psychopathy and the activity participants completed with their partner on the number of hard
cards placed on the board in condition A (Table 19).
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Table 19: Regression of Psychopathy on Risk for those who Completed Condition B First

-.312[-.693,

No. Hard
Cards
A to C
-.588[-.942,

No. Hard
Cards
A to B
-.525[-.867,

Board
Difficulty
A to C
-.461[-.846,

Board
Difficulty
A to B
-.329[-.713,

-.125]*

.069]

-.234]*

-.184]*

-.075]*

.056]

.235[-.051,

.194[-.112,

.248[-.040,

.252[-.022,

.148[-.166,

.057[-.251,

.521]

.500]

.536]

.526]+

.461]

.364]

-.132[-.430,

-.182[-.502,

-.052[-.350,

-.101[-.386,

-.086[-.413,

-.105[-.427,

.166]

.137]

.247]

.184]

.241]

.217]

.388[.031,

.268[-.114,

.462[.107,

.438[.097,

.321[-.065,

.286[-.099,

.744]*

.649]

.816]*

.780]*

.706]

.670]

Psych*Obj.

-.477[-.805,

-.426[-.776,

-.394[-.719,

-.607[-.920,

-.342[-.695,

-.440[-.793,

Numeracy

-.150]*

-.077]*

-.069]*

-.293]*

.011]+

-.087]*

-.073[-.359,

.043[-.263,

-.056[-.344,

-.237[-.511,

.067[-.246,

-.123[-.430,

.213]

.349]

.232]

0.37]+

.380]

.185]

-.001[-.328,

.052[-.298,

.013[-.312,

.125[-.189,

.087[-.266,

.013[-.340,

.327]

.402]

.338]

.483]

.440]

.366]

No. Hard A

Board
Difficulty A

-.482[-.808,
Psychopathy

Obj. Numeracy

Condition

Psych*Condition

Condition*Obj.
Numeracy
Psych*Cond*Obj.
Numeracy

*p < .05

+p < .090

Specifically, those who did not bond with their partner and were lower in psychopathy
placed more hard cards on the board in condition A than did those who did not bond with their
partner and were higher in psychopathy (Figure 20). However, among those higher in
psychopathy, those who bonded placed more hard cards on the board in condition A than those
who did the neutral activity with their partner (Figure 20).
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Figure 20. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A (otherreward only) for participants who completed condition B (self- and other-reward
asymmetry) first
The interaction between psychopathy and activity completed by participants was also
significant for the difference in the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A
compared to condition C (Table 19). Those who did not bond with their partner and were lower
in psychopathy placed more hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition C
than did those who did not bond with their partner and were higher in psychopathy (Figure 21).
In contrast, for those who bonded with their partner, psychopathy did not appear to change the
difference in the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition
C (Figure 21).
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Figure 21. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A (otherreward only) compared to C (self-reward only) for participants who completed
condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) first
The interaction between psychopathy and activity was also significant for the difference
in the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition B (Table
19). Again, those who did not bond with their partner and were lower in psychopathy placed
more hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition B than did those who did not
bond with their partner and were higher in psychopathy (Figure 22).
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Figure 22. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A (otherreward only) compared to condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) for
participants who completed condition B first
There were also several significant effects for the interaction between psychopathy and
objective numeracy including: number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A, the
difficulty of the board in condition A, the difference in the number of hard cards placed on the
board in condition A compared to condition C, the difference in the number of hard cards placed
on the board in condition A compared to condition B, and the difference in the difficulty of the
board in condition A compared to condition B (Table 19). Expressly, those who were higher in
objective numeracy and lower in psychopathy placed more hard cards on the board in condition
A compared to those higher in objective numeracy and psychopathy (Figure 23). On the other
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hand, there was not an observable difference based on psychopathy in the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A based on objective numeracy (Figure 23). A similar trend
was exhibited for the difficulty of the board in condition A (Figure 24).

Figure 23. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
psychopathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A (otherreward only) for participants who completed condition B first (self- and otherreward asymmetry)
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Figure 24. Interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the difficulty of the
board in condition A (other-reward only) for participants who completed condition
B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) first
Additionally, for those lower in psychopathy, those who were lower in objective
numeracy placed fewer hard cards on the board in condition A compared to condition C than did
those higher in objective numeracy (Figure 25). Those higher in objective numeracy and lower
in psychopathy also placed significantly more hard cards on the board (Figure 26) and created a
more difficult board (Figure 27) in condition A compared to condition B.
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Figure 25. Interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition C
(self-reward only) for participants who completed condition B first

88

Figure 26. Interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition B
(self- and other-reward asymmetry) for participants who completed condition B
first

89

Figure 27. Interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the difficulty of the
board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition B (self- and otherreward asymmetry) for participants who completed condition B first
There was also a marginally significant effect such that those higher in objective
numeracy and lower in psychopathy placed more hard cards on the board in condition A
compared to condition C than did those higher in psychopathy and objective numeracy (Table
19; Figure 28).
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Figure 28. Interaction between psychopathy and objective numeracy on the difficulty of the
board in condition A (other-reward only) compared to condition C (self-reward
only) for participants who completed condition B (self- and other-reward
asymmetry) first
A significant interaction between activity completed by participants and objective
numeracy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition
B was also observed (Table 19). Those who engaged in the neutral activity with their partner
and were high in subjective numeracy placed more hard cards on the board in condition A
compared to condition B than did those who were lower in subjective numeracy (Figure 29). In
contrast, there was not a difference in the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition
A compared to condition B among those who bonded with their partner based on objective
numeracy (Figure 29).
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Figure 29. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
objective numeracy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A
(other-reward only) compared to condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry)
for participants who completed condition B first
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Finally, there was a marginally significant effect of objective numeracy such that those
higher in objective numeracy placed more hard cards on the board in condition A than in
condition B (Table 19).
3.7 EFFECT OF EMPATHY
As previous studies have found a significant effect of empathy on decisions made for
oneself versus others (e.g., O’Connell et al., 2013), the effect of empathy was also examined
using a series of linear regressions. There was a significant effect such that those higher in
empathy placed fewer hard cards on the board in condition B (Table 20).
Table 20: Regression of Empathy on Risk for Each Scenario

Empathy

Condition

Emp*Condition

Board

Board

Board

Difficulty A

Difficulty B

Difficulty C

-.046[-.229,

-.141[-.319,

-.111[-.292,

-.052[-.246,

-.021]*

.136]

.038]

.069]

.141]

.146[-.030,

-.138[-.311,

-.036[-.218,

.093[-.084,

-.100[-.277,

-.061[-.246,

.321]

.035]

.146]

.270]

.077]

.123]

-.084[-.261,

.056[-.119,

-.038[-.220,

.011[-.168,

.119[-.062,

.041[-.153,

.092]

.231]

.145]

.189]

.299]

.234]

No. Hard A

No. Hard B

No. Hard C

-.127[-.304,

-.195[-.370,

.050]

*p < .05
There was also a significant effect of condition such that those in the bonding condition
placed more hard cards on the board in condition A than in condition B (Table 21). None of the
other effects were significant.
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Table 21: Regression of Empathy on Risk Differences Between Each Scenarios

Empathy

Condition

Emp*Condition

*p < .05

No. Hard

No. Hard

No. Hard

Board

Board

Board

Cards

Cards

Cards

Difficulty

Difficulty

Difficulty

A to C

A to B

B to C

A to C

A to B

B to C

-.069[-.249,

.069[-.105,

-.132[-.311,

-.086[-.279,

-.013[-.195,

-.081[-.275,

.111]

.243]

.048]

.107]

.168]

.112]

.141[-.039,

.233[.060,

-.085[-.264,

.112[-.072,

.157[-.022,

-.032[-.216,

.321]

.405]*

.095]

.297]

.335]+

.153]

-.036[-.217,

-.114[-.288,

.070[-.110,

-.033[-.226,

-.099[-.281,

.048[-.146,

.144]

.060]

.250]

.160]

.082]

.241]

+p < .090

3.7.1 Effect of Empathy by Order of Conditions
For participants who completed condition A first, there was a significant interaction
between empathy and whether participants bonded with their partner on the difference in the
number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A compared to condition B (Table 22).
Table 22: Regression of Empathy on Risk for those who Completed Condition A First

No. Hard A

Empathy

Condition

Emp*Condition

Board
Difficulty A

No. Hard

No. Hard

Board

Board

Cards

Cards

Difficulty

Difficulty

A to C

A to B

A to C

A to B

-.052[-.318,

-.052[-.318,

-.048[-.316,

.084[-.160,

.019[-.260,

-.016[-.274,

.213]

.213]

.221]

.328]

.298]

.241]

.056[-.192,

.056[-.192,

.109[-.143,

.246[.018,

.082[-.178,

.144[-.099,

.305]

.305]

.361]

.475]*

.342]

.386]

.059[-.207,

.059[-.207,

.082[-.186,

-.288[-.532,

.073[-.206,

-.271[-.529,

.324]

.324]

.350]

-.044]*

.352]

-.014]*

*p < .05
Specifically, those who were low in empathy and bonded with their partner placed fewer
hard cards on the board in condition B than in condition A compared to those who did not bond
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with their partner (Figure 30). However, there was not a difference in the number of hard cards
placed on the board in condition A compared to condition B among those higher in empathy
(Figure 30).

Figure 30. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
empathy on the number of hard cards placed on the board in condition A (otherreward only) compared to condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) for
participants who completed condition A first
This same trend was observed for the interaction between empathy and activity
participants completed with their partner on the difference in board difficulty in condition A
compared to condition B (Table 22; Figure 31).
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Figure 31. Interaction between bonding (high condition)/non-bonding (low condition) and
empathy on the difficulty of the board in condition A (other-reward only) compared
to condition B (self- and other-reward asymmetry) for participants who completed
condition A first
Activity was also significantly related to the number of hard cards placed on the board in
condition A compared to condition B such that those who bonded with their partner placed more
hard cards on the board in condition A than condition B (Table 22).
None of the regressions examining the effect of empathy, activity completed by
participants, or the interaction between these variables on indices of board difficulty when
participants completed condition B first were significant (Table 23).
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Table 23: Regression of Empathy on Risk for those who Completed Condition B First

No. Hard A

Empathy

Condition

Emp*Condition

Board
Difficulty A

No. Hard

No. Hard

Board

Board

Cards

Cards

Difficulty

Difficulty

A to C

A to B

A to C

A to B

-.021[-.324,

-.112[-.418,

.146[-.158,

.034[-.273,

-.033[-.373,

-.059[-.373,

.282]

.194]

.450]

.341]

.308]

.255]

-.050[-.354,

-.083[-.390,

-.006[-.314,

.031[-.277,

.003[-.321,

-.023[-.334,

.254]

.224]

.301]

.339]

.327]

.288]

-.165[-.468,

.006[-.300,

-.161[-.465,

-.076[-.383,

-.136[-.476,

-.110[-.424,

.138]

.312]

.143]

.231]

.204]

.204]

3.8 EFFECT OF CONTROL VARIABLES
The effect of several control variables on the Independent Variables of interest and
Dependent Variables was assessed. First, the effect of participants’ perception of their chance
and their partner’s chance of winning the raffle was examined using a series of correlations.
These analyses indicated that there was not a significant relationship between the participants’
perception of their partner’s chance of winning the raffle and any of the personality measures
(e.g., psychopathy, empathy), numeracy measures (e.g., subjective numeracy), or dependent
variables (i.e., board difficulty), p’s > 0.05 (Table 24).
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Table 24: Correlation of Self-report and Dependent Variables with Perception of Partner’s/Self
Chance of Winning Raffle
Perception of Partner’s

Perception of Self Chance

Chance of Winning Raffle

of Winning Raffle

1. Psychopathy

.135

.263*

2. Narcissism

.010

.146

3. Machiavellianism

-.115

-.079

4. Obj. Numeracy

-.063

-.081

5. Subj. Numeracy

-.056

-.068

6. Empathy

-.140

-.240*

7. No. Hard A

.111

.190*

8. No. Hard B

-.026

.064*

9. No. Hard C

-.023

.000

10. Board Difficulty A

.083

.197*

11. Board Difficulty B

-.011

.072

12. Board Difficulty C

-.037

.009

13. No. Hard Cards A to C

.111

.092

14. No. Hard Cards A to B

.109

.149

15. No. Hard Cards B to C

-.008

.061

16. Board Difficulty A to C

.097

.097

17. Board Difficulty A to B

.078

.155

18. Board Difficulty B to C

.029

.081

*p < .05
There was, however, a significant positive relationship between psychopathy and
participants’ perception of their chance of winning the raffle such that those higher in
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psychopathy thought they had a greater chance of winning the raffle 5(Table 24). There was also
a significant negative relationship between participants’ perception of their chance of winning
the raffle and empathy such that those with higher levels of empathy thought they had less
chance of winning the raffle (Table 24). There were also several positive correlations between
participants’ perception of their chance of winning the raffle and several of the dependent
variables. Specifically, those who thought they had a greater chance of winning the raffle placed
more hard cards on the board in conditions A and B and also made the board more difficult in
condition A (Table 24).
The perceived importance of the raffle winnings to the participant’s partner was also
examined using a one-way ANOVA. This analysis indicated that there was not a significant
relationship between the perceived importance of the raffle winnings to the participant’s partner
on any of the personality variables (e.g., narcissism) or dependent variables (e.g., number of hard
cards placed on the board in condition B), p’s > 0.05. However, there was a significant
relationship between the perceived importance of the raffle to the participant’s partner and
objective (F(4, 122) = 4.246, p = 0.003) and subjective (F(4, 122) = 4.115, p = 0.004) numeracy.
Specifically, those who rated the importance of the raffle winnings to their partner as ‘Not at all
Important’ (M = 2.438; SD = 0.684) had significantly lower subjective numeracy scores than
those who rated the importance as ‘Moderately Important’ (M = 3.952; SD = 1.009) or ‘Slightly
Important’ (M = 4.177; SD = 1.165). Additionally, those who rated the importance of the raffle
winnings to their partner as ‘Not at all Important’ (M = 0.417; SD = 0.247) had significantly
lower objective numeracy scores compared to those who rated the importance as ‘Very

As there was a significant relationship between psychopathy and participants’ perceived chance of winning the
raffle, I conducted a series of linear regressions examining the interaction between psychopathy and perceived
chance of winning on the indices of board difficulty. However, none of the interactions were significant, p’s > 0.05.
5
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Important’ (M = 0.647; SD = 0.230), ‘Moderately Important’ (M = 0.734; SD = 0.188), and
‘Slightly Important’ (M = 0.759; SD = 0.201).
Participants also reported the importance of the raffle winnings to themselves. A oneway ANOVA revealed that this variable was not significantly related to any of the personality
measures (e.g., empathy) or numeracy measures (e.g., subjective numeracy), p’s > 0.05. There
was, however, a significant relationship between the importance of the raffle winnings to the
participant and the difference between the board difficulty in condition B and condition C, F(4,
117) = 2.469, p = 0.049. However, a post-hoc analysis (Tukey’s HSD) did not reveal any
significant differences in the difference between the board difficulty in condition B and condition
C based on self-rated importance of the raffle winnings, p’s > 0.05. None of the other analyses
examining the relationship between the importance of the raffle winnings to the participant and
the other dependent variables were significant, p’s > 0.05.
In order to assess their awareness of the circumstances of the investment scenario,
participants were asked whether they were aware they were making decisions in the investment
scenario for raffle entries into an actual raffle for three prizes of $50. The majority of
participants reported they were aware they were making decisions to earn raffle entries for an
actual raffle (58.4%). The effect of this variable on the independent and dependent variables was
also examined using a one-way ANOVA. There were no significant differences in personality
traits (e.g., Machiavellianism), numeracy (e.g., subjective) or any of the dependent variables
(e.g., number of hard cards on the board in condition B) based on whether participants reported
being aware of the raffle, p’s > 0.05.
As previous studies have identified a link between narcissism and risk taking mediated by
overconfidence (e.g., Campbell et al., 2004) two questions were asked to each participant
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addressing their confidence that the third participant (i.e., someone they never met) would
answer a hard and an easy question correctly. The relationship between these responses and
narcissism were examined using a two-way ANOVA. This analysis indicated that there was not
a significant relationship between narcissism and confidence in a correct response to a hard (F(6,
106) = 0.795, p = 0.576) or easy (F(4, 106) = 0.310, p = 0.870) question. There was also not an
interaction between confidence in a correct response to a hard or easy question on narcissism,
F(10, 106) = 0.832, p = 0.599.
Before each condition, the researcher asked participants four comprehension questions to
ensure that participants understood the reward structure for each condition. The majority of
participants answered each question correctly and the number of incorrect responses lessened
with each subsequent question (Figure 32). This indicates that participants understood the
reward structure of each round before setting up the board.
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Figure 32. Frequency of correct and incorrect questions for the four comprehension questions
asked before each round
Participants were also asked whether they knew their partner before the study and
whether they had heard anything about the study before participating. Only three participants
reported having heard anything about the study before participating. These participants were
asked to elaborate on what they heard about the study and examination of these responses
indicated these participants had not heard anything about the study relevant to the outcomes of
interest. Fifteen participants reported having met their partner before the study session and were
asked to explain how they knew their partner. Examination of these responses indicated that the
majority of participants had seen or taken a class with their partner but were not overly familiar
with their partner. However, four participants were deemed to have a close prior relationship
with each other and were removed from analysis. Specifically, two of the participants were in a
romantic relationship and the other two participants knew each other since high school.
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Chapter 4: Discussion
4.1 SELF AND OTHER DECISION-MAKING
One of the main goals of this study was to examine the decision making process of
individuals in general when asked to make a decision involving risk for themselves, another
person, or involved balancing the risk assigned to another person for the benefit to the self. In
support of the first hypothesis, individuals made riskier choices for others when they benefited
from greater risk than they did when only the other person (i.e., other-reward only) or only they
(i.e., self-reward only) would profit or suffer a loss (H1). This finding is not readily interpretable
according to the social values explanation of self and other decision asymmetry insofar as
making riskier decisions for others in order for the self to benefit is not generally socially valued
(Stone & Allgaier, 2008). In general, there is outrage when individuals harm others, who have
trusted them, in order to get ahead. Take for example, the case of the 2008 subprime mortgage
crisis. Once revealed, individuals were so upset at the selfish actions of bankers that it sparked a
wave of protests (e.g., About, n.d.). Additionally, one might argue that individuals are not
making decisions for others in this case so much as they are making decisions for themselves.
Nevertheless, this does not assist in understanding the underlying reasons for this decision
outcome. Instead the risk-as-feelings hypothesis and cognitive hypothesis provide more
interpretable understanding of this finding.
Considering this finding from a risk-as-feelings perspective, individuals are likely to
experience a greater emotional response to the potential for self-reward than other-consequence
due to their distance from the other person (Loewenstein et al., 2001). This might then lead
individuals to differentially weighting aspects of the decision, such that the individual weights
the benefit to the self, more highly than the consequence to their partner (Beisswanger et al.,
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2003; Lu et al., 2012). In having the benefit to the self and risk to another directly in opposition,
this finding that individuals made riskier decisions for others when they benefitted from said risk
highlights this difference in the decision making process for oneself versus another. If, for
example, individuals weighted the aspects of a decision similarly and had a similar emotional
response to consequences when making choices for others, there should not be a difference in
this condition. As in the self-reward only and other-reward only conditions, the decision
involving a self- and other-reward asymmetry still involves making a decision of whether to risk
more for a potentially larger gain. In this way, were there no difference between self-reward and
other-reward decision making, individuals should not make significantly different decisions in
this condition than when the risks and rewards are all borne by one person. In this way, the
finding that there was a difference lends support to the risk-as-feelings hypothesis and the
cognitive hypothesis.
However, in contrast to previous findings and there was not a significant difference in
risk between the other-reward only and self-reward only. This contradicts previous findings that
individuals tend to make riskier decisions for others than for themselves (e.g., Andersson et al.,
2013) and that this results from individuals engaging in different decision making processes
when making decisions for others (e.g., Lowenstein et al., 2001; Polman, 2010). Additionally,
contrary to the second hypothesis, there was not a significant effect of bonding on decisions
made across conditions (H2). Put another way, how close participants felt to their partner did not
affect the level of risk participants assigned to their partner in either the other-reward only
condition or the self- and other-reward asymmetry condition. Thereby contradicting contradicts
previous findings that individuals make more similar decisions to themselves when making a
decision for a close rather than distant other (e.g., Livitan et al., 2008).
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One explanation for these contradictory is a difference in methodology, in that previous
studies have largely relied on having the participant imagine the other person for whom they are
making a decision (e.g., Albrecht et al., 2010; Livitan et al., 2008; Trump et al., 2014). In
contrast, participants in this study met their partner before making decisions for them. Although
participants engaged in different activities during their time together, it is possible that meeting
their partner who was highly similar to themselves (e.g., went to the same university, was also
taking a psychology course) caused them to use more similar emotional response when making
decisions for themselves and their partner. In fact, a previous study found that participants made
decisions more similar to the ones made for themselves for another person who they were told
attended the same (versus other) university (Livitan et al., 2008). In this way, even participants
who did not bond with their partner may have perceived the other person as similar enough to
themselves to use similar cognitive processes or experience a more similar emotional reaction to
consequences for their partner when making decisions on their behalf.
Nevertheless, the hypothesized effect of condition order was supported (H3). When
participants completed the self- and other- reward asymmetry condition first, they did make
significantly more risky decisions in the subsequent condition in which the other person would
suffer the consequence of any risky decision. This supports the idea that individuals anchor their
decisions for others to previous decisions made for themselves. Previous research has shown
that individuals anchor decisions solely affecting another person to decisions previously made
that solely affected themselves (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006). The anchoring effect found in this
study then extends this finding in demonstrating this anchoring effect even when the initial
decision affects another person as much as oneself. It appears then that individuals will anchor
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decisions for others to decisions made previously that involved themselves even if this initial
situation affected others as well as themselves.
4.2 THE DARK TRIAD
The other main goal of this study was to examine the way impersonally manipulative
traits affect the way individuals balance self- versus other-risk under three scenarios: (1) when
another person bears the risk and reward associated with a decision, (2) when the self-benefits
from making a risky decision for someone else, and (3) when the self bears the risk and reward
associated with a decision. In partial support of the hypothesis that those higher in narcissism
would make riskier decisions for others other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry
conditions (H4), those higher in narcissism made riskier decisions for their partner when they
benefitted from the increased risk (i.e., self- and other-reward asymmetry). Moreover, this
increased risk in the self- and other-reward asymmetry condition was greater than the otherreward only (i.e., the other person bears all costs and benefits from the outcome) and self-reward
only (i.e., the self bears all costs and benefits from the outcome) conditions. That those higher in
narcissism made selfish decisions supports previous findings that individuals higher in
narcissism are more self- as opposed to other- focused (e.g., Konrath et al., 2009). Expressly, as
those higher in narcissism are more concerned with self-relevant outcomes, they will prioritize
the potential for self-benefit over concerns about the consequences to others.
There was also some evidence that those higher in narcissism made riskier decisions for
their partner in the other-reward only condition than they did in the self-reward only condition;
though this was only significant for the number of hard cards on the board, and not for the
difficulty of the board. Expressly, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis posits that individuals make
riskier decisions for others due to a decreased emotional response to potential consequences
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(Lowestein et al., 2001). Additionally, those higher in narcissism already tend to perceive
themselves as more distant from others. Thus, the general tendency of individuals to discount
consequences for others coupled with the increased distance from others perceived by narcissists
might lead to greater discounting of consequences for others among those higher in narcissism.
This discounting of consequences coupled with the tendency of those higher in narcissism to
exhibit greater sensitivity to rewards when making decisions for themselves (Foster, Shenesey &
Goff, 2009) may then lead to greater risk taking when making decisions for others. Therefore,
one explanation for this finding then is that those higher in narcissism are less concerned by
potential consequences for others due to their distance from the consequences and therefore
weight the potential benefit from the risk more highly than do those lower in narcissism.
The hypothesis that those higher in narcissism who bonded with their partner would
make less risky decisions for their partner in the other-reward and self- and other-reward
asymmetry conditions than those higher in narcissism who did not bond with their partner (H5)
was not supported; none of the interactions between narcissism and condition on any of the
dependent variables were significant. However, there was a non-hypothesized finding that
suggested bonding reduce the risky decisions made by those higher in narcissism in the self- and
other-reward asymmetry condition only for those who were also high in subjective numeracy.
Potentially this is because those higher in subjective numeracy were better able to understand the
probabilities and risks associated with their decisions and were thus able to understand the risk
conferred to their partner by putting more hard cards on the board. Accordingly, those higher in
narcissism may make less risky decisions for those they are close with but only when they have
the skills to understand the risk in a given scenario. Nevertheless, this interaction was only
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marginally significant and this finding would need to be replicated to ensure this was not simply
an artifact of the data.
The hypothesis that those higher in psychopathy would make riskier decisions for others
in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions regardless of whether they
bonded with the other person (H6) only received partial support. In support of this hypothesis,
those higher in psychopathy made riskier decisions for their partner when they benefited from
the risk and their partner would suffer any negative consequences associated with the risk (i.e.,
self- and other-reward asymmetry). Further, there were several non-hypothesized findings that
suggested that those high in psychopathy and objective numeracy made riskier decisions when
they benefited from increased risk conferred to their partner than they did when they were
responsible for all benefits and consequences (i.e., self-reward only). These results are
consistent with previous findings that those high in psychopathy are willing to make risky
decisions for others when it will benefit themselves (Jones, 2013) and are even willing to
physically harm close others for a reward (Jones et al., 2016). It therefore appears then that those
high in psychopathy are generally less concerned with consequences experienced by others in
their pursuit of a reward.
However, contrary to the sixth hypothesis, those high in psychopathy did not make riskier
choices for others when they do not stand to gain from the increased risk. Specifically, those
higher in psychopathy did not make riskier choices for others even when they did not benefit
from this risk, contrary to my hypothesis. This result seems to suggest that only the potential for
self-reward engages the processes described by the response modulation hypothesis (i.e., myopic
focus on potential reward to exclusion of peripheral punishment cues) (e.g., Newman et al.,
1990). In contrast, when those high in psychopathy are not able to benefit from their decisions
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they do not make decisions that are any more or less risky than those made by individuals lower
in psychopathy. In this way, those higher in psychopathy may only make riskier decisions in
self-relevant scenarios (i.e., situations in which they have something to gain).
Consistent with the hypothesis, there were also no significant interactions between
psychopathy and objective numeracy on any of the dependent variables. Yet, there were several
non-hypothesized significant three-way interactions between psychopathy, condition, and
objective numeracy. Expressly, those high in psychopathy who were also lower in objective
numeracy and bonded with their partner made riskier decisions for their partner in the otherreward scenario (i.e., their partner would reap all benefits and suffer all consequences of the
outcome). In fact, those high in psychopathy, but low in objective numeracy made riskier
decisions in the other reward-scenario than they did self-reward scenario (i.e., they were
responsible for all consequences and benefits). Thus, it appears that those higher in psychopathy
who do not necessarily have the skills to understand the risk associated with their decision, make
riskier choices for individuals with whom they feel closer.
One explanation for this finding is that those higher in psychopathy who have bonded
with their partner view subsequent decisions for their partner as self-relevant and therefore
engage in a decision process more similar to the one they use when making decisions for
themselves. Explicitly, when making decisions for themselves, those high in psychopathy have a
tendency to focus on the goal of the task to the exclusion of punishment cues (e.g., Newman et
al., 1990). This results in those high in psychopathy making riskier decisions for themselves
than those lower this trait (e.g., Newman et al., 19987). However, in this study those higher in
psychopathy who did not bond with their partner, did not make riskier decisions for their partner
when they had nothing to gain. This suggests that the myopic focus on reward characteristic of
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psychopathic decision making may only be engaged for decisions in which those high in
psychopathy perceive there to be a self-relevant goal (e.g., obtaining more raffle entries for
themselves). That those high in psychopathy also make riskier decisions for others when they
have bonded with them would then suggest that bonding makes the potential reward for another
person self-relevant. Further, these decisions for close others made by those high in psychopathy
are likely to be even more risky – as was found in this study – than those they make for
themselves due to the general tendency for individuals to react less negatively to consequences
affecting others (e.g., Beisswanger et al., 2003). As those high in psychopathy are already less
likely to consider the consequences of their decisions in pursuit of a goal, this tendency is likely
to be exaggerated given the separation of making decisions for others. Nevertheless, these
explanations must be replicated in order to determine that these findings are not an artifact of the
data. Accordingly, it is well to emphasize caution in considering these explanations, as these are
post-hoc explanations of non-hypothesized findings.
There was also a surprising finding that the order of conditions affected the relationship
between psychopathy and the outcomes of interest. In analyzing only participants who
completed the self- and other-reward asymmetry condition before the other-reward condition,
those high in psychopathy made riskier decisions for themselves (i.e., self-reward) than their
partner (i.e., other reward). However, those high in psychopathy who bonded with their partner
made riskier decisions for their partner in the other-reward only condition (i.e., their partner
would suffer any consequences and benefit from any gains). Indeed, those higher in
psychopathy who bonded with their partner made riskier decisions for their partner in the otherreward condition than in the self-reward condition than did those who were high in psychopathy
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and did not bond with their partner. Unlike in the analyses conducted using all participants, this
finding was not mediated by objective numeracy.
The hypothesis that those higher in Machiavellianism would make riskier decisions for
others in the other-reward and self- and other-reward asymmetry conditions regardless of
whether they bonded with the other person (H7) was not supported; Machiavellianism was not
associated with making riskier choices for their partner. This may be due to their suspicious
nature (Christie & Geis, 1970) such that they did not trust they would not be interacting with
their partner again. Previous studies have shown that those high in Machiavellianism make less
selfish choices for others when they may be punished for their choices (e.g., Bereczkei & Czibor,
2014). Therefore, if those high in Machiavellianism thought there was a possibility they would
suffer consequences because of their behavior they would likely make less selfish decisions.
Alternatively, the raffle may not have been enough of a reward to risk harming a potentially
fruitful relationship with another student at their university. Although these participants did not
personally know each other, they were aware that they all attended the same university and were
enrolled in a psychology class. As those higher in Machiavellianism are able to consider the
long-term consequences of their behavior (Jones & Paulhus, 2011a), they may have considered
the possibility or risking a fruitful future relationship not worth the chance to win $50.
4.3 EMPATHY
As previous studies have found that empathy is related to decisions made for others (e.g.,
O’Connell et al., 2013), also considered the effect of empathy on decisions made in this study.
Those higher in empathy made less risky decisions for others when they would benefit from this
risk. Additionally, for participants who completed the other-reward condition first there was an
effect of condition such that those who bonded with their partner made less risky decisions but
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this was true only for those lower in empathy. Therefore, it seems that feeling close to the other
person may only affect the decisions made for those lower in empathy as those higher in
empathy already make less risky decisions for others, regardless of how close they are to the
person. The fact that this effect was not found when participants completed the self and other
reward asymmetry condition first might be due to the tendency for those with higher levels of
empathy to anchor to the decisions they made for themselves (Faro & Rottenstreich, 2006).
Specifically, participants who completed the self and other reward asymmetry condition first
made a decision involving themselves – even if the decision had consequences for others – and
this might have activated the tendency for individuals high in empathy to anchor their decisions
for others to the decisions they made for themselves.
4.4 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
One limitation of the present research is the lack of a distant other neutral condition.
Specifically, that there was no effect found for bonding in this study may have been due to
participants in the neutral condition meeting their partners (who were similar to themselves) invivo. Future research is needed to determine whether the lack of bonding effect was due to the
in-vivo interaction and if so, the specific aspect of this interaction that result in making less risky
decisions for a close other. Additionally, future researchers should examine the effect of
partner’s personality on the decisions participants make for their partner. For example, previous
studies have shown that those higher in narcissism are liked more than those lower in narcissism
at initial meeting (Paulhus, 1998). It is possible then that this might affect the amount of risk
deemed acceptable for one’s partner. Finally, given some of these results were not hypothesized
(e.g,. the effect of bonding on psychopathy) future research is needed to establish the
replicability of these findings.
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4.5 CONCLUSION
Together these findings extend the literatures on self and other decision making the Dark
Triad traits in a few key ways. First, this study serves to advance the literature on self- and
other-decision making insofar as establishing that individuals make riskier decisions for others
when they benefit from this increased risk. Additionally, the several significant three-way
interactions between Dark Triad traits, bonding, and numeracy indicate that one’s comfort or
ability to work with numbers might be a key individual difference when examining individual’s
consideration of risk for the self and others.
Further, the non-hypothesized findings that bonding was effective insofar as those higher
in narcissism and subjective numeracy made less risky decisions for their partner when they
stood to benefit from increased risk serves as further evidence that narcissists’ self-focus can be
shifted to include greater concern for others. Moreover, the unexpected interaction between
psychopathy and bonding provides initial evidence that the decision making process described by
the response modulation hypothesis is true only for decisions that are self-relevant. However,
future studies are needed establish the replicability of these three-way interactions, as they were
not hypothesized. Furthermore, as the pattern of findings for each of the dark triad traits
diverged, these findings support the uniqueness of these constructs and contradict the
unificationist perspective that the same trait underlies all three personalities.
Finally, this study generally serves to elucidate the problematic nature of the typical
incentive structure for portfolio managers, which is based on self- and other-reward asymmetries
(Brown, 1996). Expressly, these findings indicate that these incentive structures likely lead
individuals to take greater risks for their clients. Those portfolio managers high in
interpersonally manipulative traits are especially likely to make risky decisions for their clients
in order to obtain a reward.
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Appendix A
Narcissistic Personality Inventory – 13
Instructions: Read each pair of statements and then choose the one that is closer to your own
feelings. Indicate your answer by circling the letter “A” or “B” to the left of the item. Please do
not skip any items.
A When people compliment me I sometimes get embarrassed.
B I know that I am good because everybody keeps telling me so.

A I like having authority over people.
B I don’t mind following orders.

A I find it easy to manipulate people.
B I don’t like it when I find myself manipulating people.

A I insist upon getting the respect that is due me.
B I usually get the respect that I deserve.

A I don’t particularly like to show off my body.
B I like to display my body.

A My body is nothing special.
B I like to look at my body.
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A I try not to be a show off.
B I am apt to show off if I get the chance.

A I expect a great deal from other people.
B I like to do things for other people.

A I will never be satisfied until I get all that I deserve.
B I take my satisfactions as they come.

A I have a strong will to power.
B Power for its own sake doesn’t interest me.

A I like to look at myself in the mirror.
B I am not particularly interested in looking at myself in the mirror.

A Being an authority doesn’t mean that much to me.
B People always seem to recognize my authority.

A I am a born leader.
B Leadership is a quality that takes a long time to develop.
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Appendix B
Mach-IV
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with the following questions using the scale
below:
1
Strongly Disagree

2

3

4

5

Disagree

Neither Agree nor

Agree

Strongly Agree

Disagree
1. ____ The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
2. ____ When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real
reasons for wanting it rather than rather than giving reasons which might carry more
weight. *
3. ____ Anyone who completely trusts anyone is asking for trouble.
4. ____ It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
5. ____ Honesty is the best policy in all cases. *
6. ____ It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out
when they are given a chance.
7. ____ Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
8. ____ One should take action only when sure it is morally right. *
9. ____ It is wise to flatter important people.
10. ____ All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and
dishonest.*
11. ____ Barnum was very wrong when he said there’s a sucker born every minute. *
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12. ____ People suffering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put
painlessly to death.
13. ____ It is possible to be good in all respects. *
14. ____ Most people are basically good and kind. *
15. ____ There is no excuse for lying to someone else. *
16. ____ Most people forget more easily the death of a parent than the loss of their
property.
17. ____ Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean moral lives. *
18. ____ Generally speaking, people won’t work unless they’re forced to do so.
19. ____ The biggest difference between most criminals and other people is that criminals
are stupid enough to get caught.
20. ____ Most people are brave. *
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Appendix C
Empathy Quotient
Instructions: Please indicate how much you agree with the following questions using the scale
below:
1
Strongly Agree

2

3

4

Slightly Agree

Slightly Disagree

Strongly Disagree

1. ____ I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter a conversation.*
2. ____ I prefer animals to humans.
3. ____ I try to keep up with the current trends and fashions.
4. ____ I find it difficult to explain to others things that I understand easily, when they don’t
understand it the first time.*
5. ____ I dream most nights.
6. ____ I really enjoy caring for other people.*
7. ____ I try to solve my own problems rather than discussing them with others.
8. ____ I find it hard to know what to do in social situations.*
9. ____ I am at my best first thing in the morning.
10. ____ People often tell me that I went too far in driving my point home in a discussion.*
11. ____ It doesn’t bother me too much if I am late meeting a friend.*
12. ____ Friendships and relationships are just too difficult, so I tend not to bother with
them.*
13. ____ I would never break a law, no matter how minor.
14. ____ I often find it difficult to judge if something is rude or polite.*
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15. ____ In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own thoughts rather than on what my
listener might be thinking.*
16. ____ I prefer practical jokes to verbal humor.
17. ____ I live life for today rather than the future.
18. ____ When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms to see what would happen.*
19. ____ I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing but means another.*
20. ____ I tend to have very strong opinions about morality.
21. ____ It is hard for me to see why some things upset people so much.*
22. ____ I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s shoes.*
23. ____ I think that good manners are the most important thing a parent can teach their
child.
24. ____ I like to do things on the spur of the moment.
25. ____ I am good at predicting how someone will feel.*
26. ____ I am quick to spot when someone in a group is feeling awkward or uncomfortable.*
27. ____ If I say something that someone else is offended by, I think that’s their problem, not
mine.*
28. ____ If anyone asked me if I liked their haircut, I would reply truthfully, even if I didn’t
like it.*
29. ____ I can’t always see why someone should have felt offended by a remark.*
30. ____ People often tell me that I am very unpredictable.
31. ____ I enjoy being the center of attention at any social gathering.
32. ____ Seeing people cry doesn’t really upset me.*
33. ____ I enjoy having discussions about politics.
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34. ____ I am very blunt, which some people take to be rudeness, even though this is
unintentional.*
35. ____ I don’t tend to find social situations confusing.*
36. ____ Other people tell me I am good at understanding how they are feeling and what they
are thinking.*
37. ____ When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their experiences rather than my own.*
38. ____ It upsets me to see an animal in pain.*
39. ____ I am able to make decisions without being influenced by people’s feelings.*
40. ____ I can’t relax until I have done everything I planned to do that day.
41. ____ I can easily tell if someone else is interested or bored with what I am saying.*
42. ____ I get upset if I see people suffering on news programmes.*
43. ____ Friends usually talk to me about their problems as they say that I am very
understanding.*
44. ____ I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other person doesn’t tell me.*
45. ____ I often start new hobbies but quickly become bored with them and move on to
something else.
46. ____ People sometimes tell me that I have gone too far with teasing.*
47. ____ I would be too nervous to go on a big rollercoaster.
48. ____ Other people, often say that I am insensitive, though I don’t always see why.*
49. ____ If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up to them to make an effort to join
in.*
50. ____ I usually stay emotionally detached when watching a film.*
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51. ____ I like to be very organized in day-to-day life and often make lists of the chores I
have to do.
52. ____ I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly and intuitively.*
53. ____ I don’t like to take risks.
54. ____ I can easily work out what another person might want to talk about.*
55. ____ I can tell if someone is masking their true emotion.*
56. ____ Before making a decision I always weigh up the pros and cons.
57. ____ I don’t consciously work out the rules of social situations.*
58. ____ I am good at predicting what someone will do.*
59. ____ I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s problems.*
60. ____ I can usually appreciate the other person’s viewpoint, even if I don’t agree with it.*

139

Appendix D
Subjective Numeracy Scale
1. How good are you at working with fractions?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all good

Extremely good

2. How good are you at working with percentages?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all good

Extremely good

3. How good are you at calculating a 15% tip?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all good

Extremely good

4. How good are you at figuring out how much a shirt will cost if it is 25% off?
1

2

3

4

5

6

Not at all good

Extremely good

5. When reading the newspaper, how helpful do you find tables and graphs that are part of a
story?
1

2

3

4
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5

6

Not at all

Extremely

6. When people tell you the chance of something happening, do you prefer that they use
words (“it rarely happens”) or numbers (“there’s a 1% chance”)?
1

2

3

4

5

Always prefer words

6
Always prefer numbers

7. When you hear a weather forecast, do you prefer predictions using percentages (e.g.,
“there will be a 20% chance of rain today”) or predictions using only words (e.g., “there
is a small chance of rain today”)?
1

2

3

4

5

Always prefer percentages

6
Always prefer numbers

8. How often do you find numerical information to be useful?
1

2

3

4

Never

5

6
Very often
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Appendix E
Objective Numeracy Scale
1. Imagine that we rolled a fair, six-sided die 1,000 times. Out of 1,000 rolls, how many
times do you think the die would come up even (2, 4, or 6)? _______________________
2. In the BIG BUCKS LOTTERY, the chances of winning a $10.00 prize is 1%. What is
your best guess about how many people would win a $10.00 prize if 1,000 people each
buy a single ticket to BIG BUCKS? __________________________________________
3. In the ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES, the chance of winning a care is 1 in
1,000. What percent of tickets to ACME PUBLISHING SWEEPSTAKES win a car?
________________________________________________________________________
4. Which of the following represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
________ 1 in 100
________ 1 in 1000
________ 1 in 10
5. Which of the following numbers represents the biggest risk of getting a disease?
________ 1%
________ 10%
________ 5%
6. If person A’s risk of getting a disease is 1% in ten years, and person B’s risk is double
that of A’s, what is B’s risk? ________________________________________________
7. If person A’s chance of getting a disease is 1 in 100 in ten years, and person B’s risk is
double that of A’s, what is B’s risk? __________________________________________
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8. If the chance of getting a disease is 10%, how many people out of 100 would be expected
to get the disease?
a. Out of 100? __________
b. Out of 1000? _________
9. If the chance of getting a disease is 20 out of 100, this would be the same as having a
_____ % of getting the disease.
10. The chance of getting a viral infection is .005. Out of 10,000 people, about how many of
them are expected to get infected?
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Appendix F
Inclusion of Other in the Self Scale
Instructions: Please circle the picture below which best describes your relationship with the
other person whom you participated with today.
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Appendix G
Instructions for Investment Scenario Given to Participants

Investment Scenario Instructions
1. Select 11 cards from the piles
a. You can pick all 11 from one type of question or can
be from a mix of Easy and Hard questions.
2. Place cards on the board so you cannot see the questions.
3. Roll the dice.
4. The experimenter will write down which question
corresponds with your roll to ask the third participant once
you have completed all the rounds of the investment
scenario.
Example: If you roll the dice and one die shows a 4 and the
other shows a 3, the experimenter will write down which
question is on the 7 slot.
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Appendix H
Reward Structure for Each Round Given to Participants

146

147

Vita
Jessica Rose Carre was raised in Charlotte, NC. The only daughter of Robin Hicks and
David Strawn, she graduated from Furman University in May 2013. During her time at Furman
she worked in several research laboratories and completed an honor’s under the supervision of
Frank Provenzano, PhD.
As a graduate student Jessica has published three first authored papers in places such as
the Journal of Personality Disorders, Review of General Psychology, and Journal of Personality
and Individual Differences. She has also presented three posters at national psychology
conferences such as the Society for Personality and Social Psychology. Broadly, her research
focuses on decision making among those high in Dark Triad traits – a group of three personality
traits associated with interpersonal manipulation and a lack of empathy.
During her time as a graduate student, she has taught a course writing psychological
studies twice and has worked as a program evaluator for a year and a half. She has also served
as an ad-hoc reviewer for the Journal of Personality and Individual Differences. Jessica will
continue her studies as a doctoral student in the Legal Psychology program at the University of
Texas at El Paso.

Contact Information: jrcarre@miners.utep.edu

148

